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This dissertation investigated the effects of safety culture and ethical leadership on safety
performance in Fractional jet pilots in the United States. The primary objective was to
develop a well-fitted model linking these constructs. A composite survey instrument was
developed from instruments previously validated in the literature.
There were 305 complete and valid responses from Fractional pilots. The
hypothesized factor structure consisted of seven factors. The exogenous factor of safety
culture was made up of four sub-factors. The endogenous factors included ethical
leadership, pilot commitment, and safety performance. Safety performance was a second
order factor consisting of errors and attitudes to violations. The hypothesized model was
not well fit for the data; therefore, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted. The
new model consisted of three factors: safety culture new, ethical leadership new, and not
following procedures.
A structural equation model was developed to test the relationships between
constructs. Safety culture new demonstrated a strong and significant positive effect on
ethical leadership new. Safety culture new, unexpectedly, did not have a significant
negative relationship with not following procedures. Additionally, ethical leadership new
did not have a significant negative effect on not following procedures. These findings
iii

conflicted with previous studies in the literature that confirmed a significant relationship
between both safety culture and ethical leadership with safety behavior. The main
finding illuminates the influence of safety culture new on ethical leadership new.
Additional findings showed the factor structure for most of the previously validated
survey instruments was not maintained in this study with the Fractional pilot data.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Flying on U.S. registered private jets for hire (U.S. jets) is considered a very safe
endeavor, especially compared to flying on private jets in many other countries (Robert
Breiling Annual Aircraft Accident Review, 2014). However, some research states the
accident rate in general aviation remains too high and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) has lagged in its responsibility to regulate general aviation to
improve safety outcomes (Kuhn, 2009). As evidence of the FAA’s failure to effectively
ensure safety in General Aviation, Kuhn (2009) points to the fact that the FAA has yet to
mandate the use of Safety Management Systems (SMSs), with their associated reporting
requirements, for either type of for-hire U.S. jet operation: fractional aircraft ownership
programs (Fractionals) or 14 CFR air-taxi operations (Charter).
Over the 25-year period from 1990 through 2014, U.S. jets experienced 410
accidents, with only 96 (23%) of those having fatalities (Breiling, 2014). Over the period
from 2007 through 2014, inclusive, there were 126 accidents involving U.S. jets with 27
(21%) of those resulting in fatalities. According to the research firm JetNet’s
website(www.jetnet.com) , the number of U.S. jets at the beginning of 1990 was 7,336,
while by the end of 2007 that number had risen 63% to 11,961. Despite the increase in
the number of U.S. jets, the average annual rate of both non-fatal accidents and fatal
accidents has been on a downward trend. During the period from 1990 through 2006, the
annualized mean number of accidents was 16.6 per year with 4.3 of those being fatal
accidents. From 2007 through 2014, those rates had declined to 15.8 and 3.4 per year,
respectively.
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During the period 2007 through 2014, for domestic flights U.S. jets had an
average of 1.8 million departures and 2.8 million flight hours. This total does not include
the flights taken by U.S. jets abroad. Therefore, since the accident data includes all
flights of U.S. jets, the accident per flight hour rate is presumably lower than reported.
The average accident rate per 100,000 flight hours for U.S. jets was 0.55 during this
period. The fatal accident rate during the same period was 0.12. This equates to one fatal
accident involving a U.S. jet about every 800,000 flight hours.
A traveler can arrange for flights on U.S. jets in three predominant service
models: chartering a jet for hire (Charter), fractional ownership (Fractional), and
ownership. Charter, which is similar to using a taxi or car service, is where an aircraft
manager supplies the pilot and aircraft. In U.S. aviation, the operator responsible for
these Charter flights is called the aircraft manger. The aircraft manager must maintain a
Federal Aviation Regulation 14 CFR part 135 (FAR 135) certificate with the FAA in
order to offer charter flights to the public for hire.
A second option, Fractional, is a model in which a consumer buys a share of a
specific aircraft and the designated aircraft management company flies the owner
whenever a trip is requested. Though regulated under its own section of 14 CFR, namely
part 91(k) (FAR 91(k)), these Fractional manager’s flights are often flown under the
arguably more stringent FAR 135 rules and regulations, where the management
company, rather than the owner, maintains operational control of the majority of the
flights.
The final option to fly a jet privately is full ownership, where a person or entity
purchases a private aircraft. The private jet owner is responsible for the operation of the
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aircraft. Many of the owner’s responsibilities can be delegated to an aircraft management
company; however, the owner maintains operational control under 14 CFR part 91 (FAR
91).
Both Fractional and Charter managers hold the same type of FAR 135 certificate,
operate under similar rules and regulations, maintain operational control of the majority
of their flights, and are subject to similar scrutiny by the FAA. However, the annual
accident totals and accidents per hour flown rates are substantially different between
these two groups as shown in Figure 1. Over the 25-year period from 1990 through 2014,
the U.S. jet Charter operators have been involved in 188 accidents with 46 (24%) of those
being fatal. The U.S. jet Fractional operators were involved in just 26 accidents over the
same period with zero fatal accidents. In the period from 2007 through 2014, the U.S. jet
Charter operators have averaged a rate of 6.0 accidents with 1.4 (23%) fatal accidents per
year, while the Fractional operators have averaged 1.4 accidents per year and zero fatal
accidents (Robert Breiling Annual Aircraft Accident Review, 2014).
In the period from 2007 through 2014, the U.S. jet Charter accident rate per
100,000 flight hours averaged .71 (TRAQPak Report, 2014). The fatal accident rate
during the same period was .16. The U.S. jet Fractional accident rate during the same
period was .27 per 100,000 flight hours with zero fatal accidents. The Charter rate of
accidents per 100,000 flight hours of 0.71 is 0.16 (29%) higher than the U.S. jet fleet
average of 0.55; conversely, the Fractional rate is 0.28 (51%) lower at 0.27. The fatal
accident rate per 100,000 flight hours for Charter (0.16) is .04 (33%) higher than the U.S.
jet average of 0.12, while Fractional did not have a fatal accident during this period.

4
Fractional did not had a single fatal accident during the period of 1990 through 2014
(Robert Breiling Annual Aircraft Accident Review, 2014).
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Figure 1. U.S. Jet Accident Rate. The U.S. jet fleet average accident rate per 100,000
flight hours for the period of 2007 through 2014. (Breiling 2014; TRAQpak 2014).

The focus on causation of aircraft accidents has shifted since the early 1990s. The
previous research on accident causation concentrated on a very granular search for the
final causal or contributing factors that lead to the accident. This causation research often
pointed to the last line of defense in the entire safety system: the pilot. Accident
investigators diligently searched for the smoking gun or the last item in a chain of events
that, had it been corrected likely would have changed the course of events and prevented
the accident. Because pilots are the last line of defense in the safety system, they were
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indicated as the main causal factor in the vast majority of aviation accidents (Vincoli,
1990).
In the last 25 years, safety has evolved into its own discipline where processes are
designed and implemented to make flying safer (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015). Historically,
pilots were blamed as the cause of most aviation accidents; however, in the 1990’s, this
trend started to evolve. This paradigm shift was the result of the growing understanding
of safety as a system and consideration of the multiple causal interactions of accidents.
These multiple causal interactions include those that reside within the flight organization,
such as group behaviors and culture. Many human factors researchers, such as von
Thaden, Wiegmann, & Shappell (2006); Jennings (2008); and Li, Harris, and Yu (2008)
have revisited aviation accidents dating back many years and have persuasively
demonstrated that the organization and its characteristics strongly influenced the causal
factors of the majority of accidents. The aforementioned research results were important
because they illuminated the key interrelationships within an organization. This
increased understanding of these key interrelationships provided the opportunity to make
organizational changes that were likely to further enhance safety.
As a result of this shift in understanding of the importance of organizational
characteristics in maintaining and improving safety, the effort to measure the safety
culture, organizational commitment, and even ethics of the organization has gained
momentum in the literature. Researchers have attempted to develop and validate survey
instruments to take these measurements in order to better understand how they influence
safety outcomes, such as occupational accidents and safety performance (Alsowayigh,
2014; Freiwald, 2013; Zohar, 1980). If the safety culture or ethics of an organization can
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be accurately measured and shown to have a predictable influence on future safety
outcomes or performance, this could create an opportunity for comparatively low cost
interventions that would significantly improve safety in the system (Freiwald, 2013).

Statement of the Problem
To date, the relationship of safety culture, ethical leadership, pilot commitment to
the organization, and safety performance has not been measured or investigated in U.S.
jet Fractionals. Though these constructs have been studied in many airlines, the
Fractionals differ operationally from airlines in many ways. The Fractionals, for
example, fly exclusively point to point and do not fly in the hub-and-spoke flight patterns
common to most airlines. The historical differences in the total number and rate of both
fatal and non-fatal accidents are strong quantitative evidence that suggests there are
operational and likely cultural differences between the U.S. jet Fractional and U.S. jet
Charter operators.

Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study was to examine: (1) the Fractional pilots’ perceptions of
their organizations’ level of safety culture and ethical leadership, and (2) the potential
influence of these perceptions on the pilot’s commitment to the organization and their
safety performance. Since the Fractional operators have fewer accidents than the Charter
operators in the U.S. during the period under review, the practical application of this
research could be the identification of a baseline model for safety culture. Future studies
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would be required to research the safety culture of the Charter companies and compare
results.

Research Questions
This research addressed four questions that were derived from the research
conducted by Alsowayigh (2014) on Saudi Airline pilots and Freiwald (2013) on aviation
and healthcare personnel.
1. How does safety culture influence safety performance at U.S. jet Fractionals?
2. How does safety culture influence ethical leadership at U.S. jet Fractionals?
3. How does safety culture influence pilot commitment to the organization at U.S.
jet Fractionals?
4. How do ethical leadership and pilot commitment to the organization influence
safety performance at U.S. jet Fractionals?

Delimitations
The survey data collected in this study were comprised of responses from the
pilots of major U.S. jet FAR 135 Fractional operators with more than 25 jets under
management. The 25 jet minimum was selected because only three companies exceed 25
jets (NetJets, FlexJet, and Executive AirShare) and are estimated to operate 97.6% of the
Fractional jet aircraft in the U.S. (www.JetNet.com; November 7, 2015).
It was not within the scope of this research to investigate safety outcomes from
the NTSB accident investigation reports, Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA),
or other criterion-based data to search for relationships or causation. This is due to the
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concern in the literature that accident rates are too low to make valid predictions
(O’Connor et al., 2011), and criterion based data such as FOQA are not consistently
recorded across general aviation aircraft (Cistone et al., 2011); data recording systems are
expensive to install and therefore inconsistently deployed in the fleet (Mitchell, Sholy, &
Stolzer, 2007); and data that were recorded are not publically available.
This research was not intended to develop the appropriate path to improvement of
U.S. jet FAR 135 operations, but rather to determine the relationships between safety
culture, ethical leadership, pilot commitment, and safety performance of U.S. jet
Fractionals.

Limitations
This study was intended to measure and investigate the relationships between the
constructs of safety culture, ethical leadership, and safety performance for U.S. jet
Fractional operators. It was assumed that due to the fact the pilots were notified through
their unions, nearly all pilots had the opportunity to complete the survey, and therefore
the results will likely be generalizable throughout the organization. Additionally, since
these pilots represent over 97% of the Fractional pilots in the U.S., the results are likely
to be generalizable to all U.S. Fractional pilots. Non-response bias was tested through a
comparison of the results between different survey collection dates. The comparison
included an analysis of the responses by similar demographic groups across various
survey collection dates.
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The construct for safety performance was self-reported items describing pilot
errors and their attitudes to violations. There are concerns in the literature about the
potential inaccuracy due to the nature of self-reported items (O’Connor et al., 2011).

Definitions of Terms
AMC

Aircraft Management Companies are those companies managing
jet aircraft and offering flights to the public for hire. Both
fractional jet managers (Fractional) and U.S. jet FAR 135 aircraft
management companies (Charter) are considered AMCs.

Charter

Charter refers to the companies where flights are
offered to the public for hire by a certificated FAR 135 aircraft
management company.

charter

When not capitalized, this term refers to flights flown by Charter
companies for hire.

Fractional(s) Fractional aircraft management company(ies)
Microaccidents

These are small workplace accidents such as cuts and bruises.

U.S. jets

Refers to U.S. registered private jets that are used in a Fractional
aircraft program or flown by a duly certificated FAR 135 aircraft
management company for hire.

List of Acronyms
AMC

Aircraft Management Company (both Fractional & Charter)

ELS

Ethical Leadership Scale
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FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FOQA

Flight Operations Quality Assurance

NTSB

National Transportation Safety Board

PCAMC

Pilot Commitment to AMC

SEM

Structural Equation Model

SCFSS

Safety Culture Formal Safety System

SCISS

Safety Culture Informal Safety System

SCOC

Safety Culture Organizational Commitment

SCOP

Safety Culture Operations Personnel

SPATV

Safety Performance Attitude To Violations

SPERR

Safety Performance Pilot Error Behavior

ZCSQ

Zohar Client Safety Questionnaire
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
Introduction
The review provided in this chapter begins with a brief history of aircraft accident
investigations and how the conduct of these investigations has evolved over the last 40
years. Accident investigation is considered one of the initial steps in aviation history
directed toward improving safety through better understanding the causal factors in
accidents and applying that knowledge to preventing similar accidents in the future
(Stolzer & Goglia, 2015). Accident investigators have, in both past and current
investigations, conducted a very granular analysis of each accident to determine the
proximate causal factors. Once the causal factors are determined, the results are
categorized and analyzed across many accidents to identify themes. The knowledge
gained from these accidents and subsequent analyses or themes has inspired the
development of new technologies, equipment, and procedures that have contributed to the
continued improvements in aviation safety (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015).
With improvements in technology, equipment, and procedures, accident
investigators began to find fewer and fewer causal factors attributable to equipment
failures (Vincoli, 1990). These improvements in the reliability of both the equipment and
procedures led investigators to label the main causal factor in the majority of accidents as
pilot or human error (Vincoli, 1990). Since the majority of accidents were and continue
to be determined to be pilot error, and the goal in aviation was to continue to improve
safety, aviation practitioners needed to better understand the causes of human error, and
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more specifically the active and latent conditions that contributed to the malfunction of
the pilot (Reason, 1990).
As the construct of human error became more fully understood, aviation accident
investigators and practitioners still needed to further adapt these concepts to an aviation
setting to continue the improvements in safety outcomes. The study of human error
provided a framework for scholars to adapt those, along with other concepts, to develop
the human factors classification system (HFACS). HFACS provided a common
taxonomy that enabled accident investigators, aviation practitioners, and researchers to
both identify and categorize human errors (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997). The errors
were labeled active (human mistakes), latent, or organizational factors (training, over
scheduling, or procedures errors, etc.) that contributed to accidents that had been labeled
as just pilot error in the past (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997).
Along with the study of HFACS, organizational culture began to emerge as an
important construct in the literature as a possible antecedent to safety outcomes (Cox &
Flin, 1998; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Zohar, 1980). Studies focusing on safety culture,
communication, cockpit resource management, employee commitment to the
organization, and company leadership began to emerge in the literature as possible
constructs that could be measured and had the potential to influence safety outcomes.
This study builds upon previous research focused on the constructs of safety
culture (Alsowayigh, 2014), ethical leadership (Freiwald, 2013), and their potential
influence on self-reported safety performance, such as a pilot admitting to making
occasional errors. If these relationships exist and are significant, this research has the
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potential to provide insight into a possible safety culture model for Charter operators to
follow that could improve safety in U.S. jet FAR 135 operations overall.

Accident Investigation
When aviation accident investigation began, there was a “fly-crash-fix-fly”
approach (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015, p.15). The investigator’s mission was to determine
the cause of the accident, publicize the results, and adopt new regulations to prevent
future re-occurrences with the same cause. The causes sometimes were related to
unforeseen weather conditions, design flaws, structural/mechanical failures, or human
error (most often by pilots and sometimes by mechanics) (Stolzer et al., 2011).
An article by Walter Tye published in 1980 demonstrates the major concerns of
the day with commercial aviation. Tye wrote, to improve aviation’s upward trend in
safety, the industry had to focus on new aircraft designs, improvements in avionics to
avoid mid-air collisions and controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), and, ultimately, better
procedures (Tye, 1980). Tye’s research estimated that approximately one-half of the fatal
commercial aviation accidents from 1972 until 1980 were the result of CFIT and,
additionally, almost 25% were from mid-air collisions (Tye, 1980).
Some examples of accidents include: In 1987 a Learjet 35A sustained substantial
damage after a hard landing in rain and heavy winds. The National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) named wind shear as one of the main contributing factors (NTSB Brief
MIA88LA026, 1989). In 1990, a Lear 24 experienced a fire in the cockpit when the
wires from the map light chafed together, causing the wires to arc, and resulting in a
cockpit fire that precipitated a forced landing (NTSB Brief ATL90LA080, 1992). A
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different accident which resulted from a gear failure on a Challenger in 1997 (NTSB
Brief: ATL96LA073, 1997) could have been avoided through better organizational
procedures. The NTSB report suggested that improved procedures at the aircraft
management company requiring use of the emergency gear extension checklist may have
prevented the accident. The NTSB recommendation centered on the pilot neglecting to
verify the gear was down and locked after an initial indication that the gear was not
locked in place, which is the proper procedure as published in the aircraft’s operating
handbook.
Tye’s suggestions from 1980 have all been adopted; first by the commercial
aircraft manufacturers and later by the private jet manufacturers. Avionics improvements
included ground proximity warning systems, traffic collision avoidance, and ground
based and cockpit based wind shear detection systems. Additionally, procedural
improvements were made such as the adoption of crew resource management (CRM)
programs. Aircraft designs improved structural soundness and systems reliability. As
Tye’s published suggestions have been implemented in aviation, the accident rates have
continued to decline.

Pilot Error Causing Accidents
The reliability of aircraft as well as of the air transportation system itself
improved in the 1980s (Vincoli, 1990). As suggested in later research, the main causal
factor in most aviation accidents was pilot error (Vincoli, 1990). In the previous 20
years, the NTSB had identified pilot error as the primary cause for 66% of aviation
accidents (Vincoli, 1990). The U.S. Army conducted a study and concluded that over
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80% of Army aviation accidents during the years 1958-1976 were the result of pilot error
(Vincoli, 1990). This led to the NTSB seemingly declaring pilot error as its default
finding, as evidenced by two cases where independent investigators reviewed the
evidence and found conclusive proof of mechanical failures previously missed by the
NTSB that were major causal factors (Vincoli, 1990).
Vincoli went on to warn the industry and the investigators that safety of flight is
the responsibility of the aircraft manager or airline, and this responsibility cannot be
delegated to the pilot (Vincoli, 1990). Vincoli also warned that if the trend of
disproportionately identifying pilot error as the primary cause in the vast majority of
accidents continued, the industry would not be able to move forward to improve safety,
nor to prevent future accidents effectively.

Human Error
In 1982, Rasmussen wrote his seminal paper describing human error, attempting
to bring structure to the construct and foster proper collection of data. In his work, he
described the characteristics and definitions associated with human failure. It was
asserted that most inadequate results or outright systems failures could be traced back to
human failure in design, operation, or maintenance (Rasmussen, 1982). The author also
pointed out that quite often the system failure was the result of a latent condition that
existed prior to the actual system failure (Rasmussen, 1982).
Reason’s 1990 book Human Error furthered the body of knowledge on the topic
of human malfunctions and continued to provide understanding of where humans are
likely to fail in a complex safety system such as those comprising aviation. Reason
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postulated that there were two main types of human errors: active and latent. Active
errors occur when the operator of a system, such as the pilot of an aircraft has the wrong
reaction to a stimulus or situation and proximately causes the system failure. Conversely,
a latent error may occur far away from and long before the system failure, such as an
aircraft manager over-scheduling a crew which contributes to the pilot’s fatigue and
reduced effectiveness (Reason, 1990). Since most pilots overestimate their personal
capabilities, they are unlikely to acknowledge or admit their reduced abilities when
stressed or fatigued (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998).

Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)
Building upon the research from Rasmussen and Reason, Shappell and Wiegmann
published Human Error Approach to Accident Investigation: The Taxonomy of Unsafe
Operations in 1997. This research contributed to what is now known as HFACS. The
authors’ objective was to develop a common taxonomy for accident investigators to use
when classifying types of human errors. A common taxonomy allows researchers and
practitioners to communicate more effectively. The goal of HFACS was to determine
both the active (human) errors and the latent (organizational) errors. Shappell &
Wiegmann attempted to determine the true root cause of aviation accidents in order to
take the next step toward improving aviation safety (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997).
In the 1990s, there was a paradigm shift in the literature in which aviation
accidents were considered to be the result of a chain of events rather than being due to a
single, proximate cause. The root causes, which had often been blamed on just the pilots,
were expanded to include the latent failures of the aviation organization (McFadden &
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Towell, 1999). Aviation accidents that were classified as pilot error have been reexamined using the HFACS perspective, and many latent or organizational errors have
been identified (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). These findings have motivated a
fundamental shift toward proactive system improvement to enable aviation organizations
to reduce the incidence of latent errors and thereby forestall accidents (McFadden &
Towell, 1999).

Culture
Culture is commonly associated with national culture and has its roots in
anthropology. It is concerned with the core values of a group (Cox & Flin, 1998). Pilots
experience three distinct cultures in their work: national, professional, and organizational
(Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). In January of 1990, Avianca Flight 52 crashed in New
York as a result of fuel starvation. The flight engineer was aware of the criticality of the
situation but failed to make those concerns known to the captain. In this situation, all
three forms of culture, national (deference to authority), professional (not questioning the
higher ranking captain), and organizational (lack of CRM) contributed to the chain of
events that resulted in an otherwise avoidable aviation accident (Helmreich & Merritt,
1998).
Aviation professionals have a distinct culture. In that professional culture, pilots
have a specialized skill that provides prestige and high pay, which encourages some
pilots to feel overconfident (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). This feeling of overconfidence
can lead to poor decision making, such as skipping routine checklists and taking
unnecessary risks (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). In the Avianca case, the crew had many
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options to divert the aircraft; however, poor crew communication led to the continuation
of the flight to the point of fuel exhaustion.
The development of CRM was motivated by a desire to address both
organizational and pilots’ professional culture factors that had been shown to contribute
to accidents. As it has been implemented in aviation organizations, CRM has
demonstrated success at increasing communications in the cockpit and breaking down
several barriers to optimally safe and efficient aircraft operation (Helmreich & Merritt,
1998). CRM is implemented in part by creating a subculture in the overall organizational
culture comprised of a set of values and norms required to support the effective use of
CRM operational practices.
National culture is a broader term related to those values, norms, and beliefs held
by particular nationalities (Helmreich, 1998). The Avianca flight is an example of the
consequences of poor or absent CRM practices. The flight engineer knew the aircraft
was critically low on fuel; however, the flight engineer neglected to communicate that
situation clearly to the captain. A combination of the flight engineer’s national culture,
Avianca’s organizational culture, and the flight engineer’s professional culture did not
provide the flight engineer with the confidence to communicate a critical safety issue to
the captain (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). Though this flight’s mishap can correctly be
assigned a proximate cause of pilot error, HFACS would identify the latent
organizational, professional, and cultural issues as major contributing factors.
Subsequent research into culture asserted that culture surrounds the organization
and is intertwined with leadership and its behavior (Schein, 2004). Therefore, a leader
can engineer culture by attempting to insert values into the organization that will
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influence and govern employee behavior and interactions (Schein, 2004). Because of the
stable nature of the values set forth in organizational culture, it has been called the
personality of the organization (Cox & Flin, 1998, Schein, 2004).

Safety Culture
“A safety culture is more than a group of individuals promulgating a set of safety
guidelines, it is a group of individuals guided in their behavior by their joint belief in the
importance of safety (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998, p. 133).”
Safety culture is a subset of the overall culture in an organization. The term
safety culture first came to prominence from the report on the Chernobyl nuclear disaster
from the International Atomic Energy Agency (Cox & Flin, 1998). The report discussed
the poor safety culture that was present in the Russian nuclear plant. Safety culture is
comprised of beliefs and values held in an organization regarding employee safety,
hazard reduction, and a safe work environment (Cox & Flin, 1998). These values are
stable, meaning they do not fluctuate in the short term (Cox & Flin, 1998). Initially,
some researchers expressed concerns that the importance of safety culture was overstated
and that it was not a proven theoretical concept (Cox & Flin, 1998). In contrast, other
research in CRM fully supported the concept of culture as relevant to understanding and
motivating positive change in the larger organizational culture, and showing that changes
in culture had the ability to improve or reduce safety (Helmreich et al., 1997).
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Safety Climate
The concept of organizational climate dates back to the 1930s; however, the
measurement of the character of an organization did not start until the 1960s (Cox & Flin,
1998). Safety climate is the subset of the organizational climate that focuses on safety
(Neal et al., 2000). The literature often treats the constructs of culture and climate
interchangeably (Mearns & Flin, 1999). The difference between culture and climate has
been compared to the differences between personality and mood of a person. A person’s
personality is based on the person’s own core values and principles, and though it can be
changed, it cannot be changed quickly; like culture, it is stable and enduring.
Organizational climate, conversely, is more closely associated with a person’s mood,
which can change quickly based on the environment and the day’s activity; therefore, it is
short term and more variable, and measurements of climate are similar to a snapshot at
one point in time (Cox & Flin, 1998).
The construct of safety climate was enhanced by the research of Zohar in the early
1980s. The research included a 40-item survey that was randomly distributed to 20
workers in 20 different industrial organizations (Zohar, 1980). The researcher then
compared the results of the survey with the results of an independent safety inspector’s
evaluation of the safety effectiveness of each industrial organization. There was a high
correlation between the inspector’s evaluations of the effectiveness of safety programs at
the different companies and the survey results from the workers (Zohar, 1980). The
highest level of correlation was between the worker’s perceptions of management’s
attitudes about safety and the rated effectiveness by the inspectors (Zohar, 1980).

21
Safety Climate and Culture as Predictors of Safety Performance (Outcomes)
The Zohar safety climate research was instrumental in developing the concept of
safety climate though the use of an independent measurement to validate the results.
Helmreich et al. used a similar validation technique in 1986; the research measured pilot
attitudes and compared those responses to their performance evaluations from
experienced check airmen. The study showed an attitude-performance linkage
(Helmreich et al., 1986).
The Zohar and Helmreich et al. studies were important because they not only
validated the construct of safety climate, they also established there was a link to
performance. The accident rate in aviation is very low; therefore, it lacks the sensitivity
to establish the predictor variables for safety performance or accidents (O’Connor et al.,
2011). The importance of measuring both safety climate and safety culture lies in the
potential to harness their predictive capability to improve safety performance and reduce
accidents.
Before 2000, there were few research studies on the connection between safety
climate and safety behavior, though many studies have shown a correlation between
safety climate and safety outcomes (Neal et al., 2000; O’Toole, 2002). Researchers
hypothesized that organizational climate would exert influence on safety climate, and
safety climate would exert influence on safety performance (Neal et al., 2000). Neal et
al. (2000) defined safety performance as compliance with procedures and promotion of
safety. It should be noted this research relied on self-reporting of safety performance,
which has been criticized in the literature as potentially biased (Barling et al., 2002).
Zohar asserted “safety climate research has been hampered by a lack of criterion data”
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(Zohar, 2000, p. 589). O’Connor et al. (2011) suggested using objective data such as
FOQA to evaluate safety performance.
The findings of the Neal et al. (2000) research support the hypothesis that
organizational climate had a significant impact on safety climate. Safety climate had a
significant impact on self-reported safety compliance, and safety climate is a predictor of
safety performance (Neal et al., 2000).
Additional criterion-based safety climate research was conducted to predict the
effect of group climate on micro-accidents in the manufacturing industry (Zohar, 2000).
This research used a newly developed scale to estimate the perception of safety climate of
factory workers. The data on micro-accidents was recorded during the five-month period
following the safety climate survey. The results established an empirical link between
safety climate and micro-accidents where the group safety climate predicted the safety
outcomes (Zohar, 2000). Zohar’s research suggested that an increase in micro-accidents
was a predictor of larger or catastrophic accidents (Zohar, 2000). In 2004, there was a
study conducted in Japan on the track maintenance train operators’ attitudes versus
objective accident data. The findings suggested that operator attitudes were significantly
correlated with accidents, and the recommendation called for proactive improvements in
attitudes in order to improve safety (Itoh et al., 2004).
Cooper & Phillips (2004) conducted a safety climate study before and after a
behavioral safety initiative. Their findings concluded the relationship of safety climate to
safety behavior though the relationship between safety behavior and accidents was not as
strong as other similar findings in the literature. Though the researchers concluded that
the statistical relationship between safety climate and accidents was neither direct nor
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significant, the research suggested that safety climate measurements are useful in
assessing the effectiveness of how safety is operationalized in an organization (Cooper &
Phillips, 2004).
A case study was undertaken to evaluate the safety culture of a large construction
company and its influence on safety performance. The construction company had
implemented safety initiatives that had varied in success across different regions. The
case study employed a mixed method analysis consisting of in-depth interviews, safety
surveys, and qualitative observations. The results indicated that safety culture had a
mediating role over safety performance (Cai, 2005). One main concern that was
identified was the construction company was found to be taking the human error position
when determining the cause of accidents rather than an organizational error approach,
which is harmful to safety culture and safety reporting (Cai, 2005).
Clarke published a meta-analysis of criterion-based research of the relationship
between safety climate, safety performance, and accidents in 2006. The research showed
that, in all studies, the relationship between safety climate was found to be positive,
though weak, and with a large standard deviation; therefore, the safety climate link to
accidents was not strongly supported (Clarke, 2006). In the case of prospective research
designs where the safety climate measurement takes place before the safety data were
collected, the link between safety climate and accidents was found to be valid and
generalizable (Clarke, 2006). The link between safety climate and safety performance
was positive, and overall the research supported the concept that improving safety
climate would improve safety performance (compliance and participation) and help to
reduce accidents (Clarke, 2006).
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Few multi-year studies have been conducted, but one exception is the research by
Neal and Griffin in 2006. This study was conducted over a five-year period with safety
climate measures from two separate sampling frames compared with criterion accident
data. The researchers were attempting to determine a link between safety climate and
safety motivation as well as the link between safety motivation and behavior, under the
hypothesis that safety motivation plays a mediating role between safety climate and
safety performance. The researchers found that there is a reciprocal relationship between
safety motivation and safety participation (safety participation is a component of safety
performance), which indicates that participating in safety tasks that benefit the
organization leads to higher motivation (Neal & Griffin, 2006). Additional findings
showed that, at the group level, self-reported safety behavior has predictive validity for
accidents (Neal & Griffin, 2006).
Despite all of the positive results cited above, Johnson opined that the predictive
validity of safety climate had not yet been firmly established in the literature (Johnson,
2007). Johnson conducted a study that used the 16 item Zohar Safety Client
Questionnaire (ZCSQ) on 292 workers at three manufacturing facilities and subsequently
monitored the accident experience data for the following five-month period. The results
showed that the ZCSQ could be reduced to 11 items with little loss of explanatory power,
and the predictive validity of safety climate to predict accidents was confirmed (Johnson,
2007).
The research result of safety climate as a valid predictor of safety performance
was further supported by Chang and Lu (2009) and then by Kao et al. (2009). However,
the predictive validity of safety climate and patient outcomes were not supported in
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Wilson’s (2007) and Lyon’s (2007) dissertations. Lyon’s dissertation on the relationship
between safety culture and infections found contrary evidence that safety climate was low
when infections were low (Lyon, 2007). Goodheart & Smith (2014) suggested that safety
climate predicting safety performance might not be generalizable to aviation from other
industries.
O’Connor et al. (2011) conducted an in-depth meta-analysis of safety climate
studies in the aviation industry. The research analyzed 23 studies conducted in aviation.
Pilots and mechanics made up nearly 65% of the respondents, while 17% had a mixed
target, and the remainders were either cabin crew or ground handlers. Half of the
respondents were military personnel. O’Connor argues that safety climate research needs
to continue to focus less on developing and validating new survey instruments and more
on the ability of the existing instruments to discriminate among groups (O’Connor et al.,
2011). The construct validity of safety climate as a social measure is reasonable, though
there is a lack of agreement in themes across aviation safety climate questionnaires
(O’Connor et al., 2011). There would be a benefit to consolidating the themes in the
literature and to have more consistency. The greater problem with the extant research is
the lack of testing of discriminant validity (O’Connor et al., 2011). If the existing
instruments are not able to discriminate among groups with differing safety performance
scores, the instruments will be of little usefulness as a leading indicator of safety issues
(O’Connor et al., 2011).
Gibbons, von Thaden, and Wiegmann designed a survey instrument in 2006 with
the intention of being more comprehensive than the existing safety climate and safety
culture instruments available. The authors named this improved survey the Commercial

26
Aviation Safety Survey (CASS). The questionnaire started as an 84 item tool but after
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), was later revised to 55 items with four general
factors (Organizational Commitment, Operations Personnel, Informal Safety System, and
Formal Safety System) and 12 sub-factors as shown in Figure 2 (Gibbons et al., 2006;
O’Connor et al. 2011; Alsowayigh, 2014). The CASS has been chosen for this research
because it has been deployed in several airlines worldwide, including Saudi Airlines in
2014 and has maintained consistent results.

Figure 2. Commercial Aviation Safety Survey Factor Structure (Alsowayigh, 2014
p.30).
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The Saudi Airlines study used the CASS and compared it with self-reported safety
performance, which was measured by pilot attitude to violations and pilot error behavior
(Alsowayigh, 2014). The study included 247 voluntary responses which represented a
29% response rate from active Saudi Airlines pilots. The results were validated with
CFA, and the relationships among variables were analyzed using structural equation
modeling (SEM) (Alsowayigh, 2014).
The Saudi Airline results showed that safety culture had a direct and significant
influence over pilot’s own attitudes to violations and had a mediating role on pilot error
behaviors (Alsowayigh, 2014). Safety culture was found to have neither a direct nor a
significant influence over pilot error behavior, though this relationship was mediated by
pilot’s attitude to violations (Alsowayigh, 2014). Pilot’s commitment to the airline did
not have a significant relationship with either pilot error behavior or attitude to violations,
which suggests that a pilot’s safety performance, as measured by these self-reported
variables, is not strongly related to the characteristics of the organization where the pilot
is employed (Alsowayigh, 2014).
The CASS was designed to be a comprehensive instrument to measure the safety
culture for aviation organizations (Gibbons et al., 2006). Other multi-use instruments,
such as Zohar’s safety climate scale are significantly shorter than the CASS and were
designed to take a quick view or snap shot of safety climate of many types of
organizations, whereas the CASS was developed specifically for the aviation industry.
Additionally, the CASS has also been deployed in many airlines worldwide, and the
constructs have remained stable. The comprehensive nature of the CASS does make it
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longer than other instruments, which requires respondents to spend more time completing
the survey.

Employee Commitment to the Organization
In the past, the commitment to the organizations was measured to determine the
likelihood of employee retention. In a longitudinal study over a six-year period, Sheridan
(1992) studied the organizational commitment by young accountants entering the
profession. The researcher controlled for changes in the economy and for labor market
fluctuations to evaluate the role of organizational culture and its relationship to employee
retention.
At about the same time the Sheridan (1992) six-year longitudinal study was
concluding, Meyer & Allen (1991) were researching the causal implications of employee
commitment to an organization. Their research showed that employee commitment to an
organization was related to how the employee was involved in decision making (Meyer
& Allen, 1991; Walton, 1985) in the organization and how their company decisions
aligned with their own values (Meyer & Allen, 1991). The researchers during this period
began to analyze the construct of employee commitment to the organization as a causal
factor; the researchers agreed that the existing structural equation models only showed
evidence of directional relationship without any conclusive findings (Meyer & Allen,
1991).
Researchers interested in the construct of employee commitment to the
organization continued to search for directional relationships. Alsowayigh (2014)
researched the pilot’s commitment to the Saudi Airlines, not as a casual factor, but as a
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mediator between safety culture and safety performance (Alsowayigh, 2014). The pilot
commitment to Saudi Airlines was measured with the Porter et al. (1974) nine-item
Organizational Commitment Questionnaire (OCQ). The OCQ has a 14-item version and
nine-item version; the nine-item version was suggested in the literature (Commerias &
Fournier, 2001) and was used in the Alsowayigh (2014) study. The OCQ measured the
employees’ willingness to go above and beyond for their organization and to what extent
employees associated themselves with the company’s success (Commerias & Fournier,
2001).
Alsowayigh’s results (2014) showed that the pilot’s commitment to Saudi Airlines
did not play a mediating role between safety culture and safety performance as measured
by self-reports of pilot error behavior and pilot attitude to violations (Alsowayigh, 2014).
However, it did reveal that safety culture was a statistically significant predictor of the
pilot commitment to the airline (Alsowayigh, 2014).

Ethics
“Ethics is the area of philosophy that deals with values and customs of a person or
society—essentially how one determines what is right or wrong. As far back as Aristotle,
ethics has been considered a fundamental driving force of human behavior” (Kapp &
Parboteeah, 2008, p. 28). Despite being labeled a fundamental driving force of human
behavior, there are relatively few studies about ethics as a construct and the role it plays
in the behavior of employees (Freiwald, 2013; Kapp & Parboteeah, 2008).
The question of what is and what is not ethical is often judged by others. There
are numerous popular media references to stories of politicians, professionals, athletes,
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and average citizens who commit acts that are judged by the writers to be wrong or
unethical (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005). The concept used in this research to
determine what is right/ethical or wrong/unethical is closest to the rule-based
utilitarianism concept (Rachels, 2002). Those acts that are considered wrong or unethical
are the ones that primarily benefit the person committing the acts while at the same time
actually or potentially harming others (Rachels, 2002). Those acts that are considered
altruistic and benefit others or society as much as or more than the person committing the
acts are considered right or ethical (Rachels, 2002).
There are rare acts that may benefit others far more than, or even risk injury to,
the person committing the acts; these acts are considered supererogatory, such as entering
a burning building to search for those in need of help (Craig & Gustafson, 1998;
Freiwald, 2013). Supererogatory acts are considered above and beyond what society
considers socially responsible, just, or ethical behavior; therefore, acts do not have to be
supererogatory to be considered ethical or right for the purposes of this research.

Ethical Leadership
Ethical leadership is “the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct
through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such
conduct to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement, and decisionmaking” (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005, p. 120). Ethical leadership is a dimension
of both ethics and leadership. In the literature, there has been little empirical research
into either the construct of ethical leadership or the outcomes influenced by ethical
leadership (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005; Craig & Gustafson, 1998; Freiwald,
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2013). The construct of ethical leadership was researched by Howell and Avolio in 1992,
though their research focused primarily on charismatic leadership. Their results
supported the theory that ethical leaders were those willing to listen to subordinates, and
unethical leaders refused to listen to them (Howell & Avolio, 1992). Other research
studies have showed that employees who perceive their leaders to have high ethical
standards are more willing to report problems without fear of reprisal (Brown et al.,
2005).
Ethical leaders are considered to be altruistic as judged by their employees; these
ethical leaders are the ones acting for the betterment of others, such as other employees
(Brown et al., 2005). The literature has shown that leaders should be concerned with
their employees’ view of their ethics (Craig & Gustafson, 1998). If their employees view
these leaders as “attractive, credible, and legitimate” (Brown et al., 2005, p. 120), their
actions and behaviors will be emulated by their subordinates. A separate article stated
these leaders need to have and maintain a high level of integrity (Craig & Gustafson,
1998). If leaders maintain these qualities, they will hold their employees’ attention and
influence their behavior (Brown et al., 2005).

Ethical Leadership Scale (ELS)
The ethical leadership scale (ELS) is a survey instrument that was developed by
Brown, Treviño, and Harrison in 2005. Their hypothesis stated ethical leadership was an
important component of both transformational and charismatic leadership (Brown et al.,
2005). The ethical leadership component is the one that relates to the ability of the leader
to inspire, and influences to what degree employees want to emulate the leader’s behavior
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(Brown et al., 2005). Brown et al. demonstrated that the construct of ethical leadership
influenced behavioral outcomes such as job satisfaction, dedication, or commitment to
the organization and the employee’s willingness to communicate issues (Brown et al.,
2005).
Brown, Treviño, and Harrison developed the ELS by initially researching the
existing literature for extant measurement instruments of charismatic, transformational,
and ethical leadership. The researchers independently developed two versions of a
measurement instrument before subsequently comparing them and eliminating their
overlap (Brown et al., 2005). The researchers then conducted in-depth interviews with 20
MBA students with professional work experience (Brown et al., 2005) to further refine
the ELS. The initial result was a 48-item survey instrument on a five point Likert scale
that measured ethical leadership.
Brown, Treviño, and Harrison conducted seven studies with the ELS. Study one
was conducted on 154 MBA students that were, on average, 29.3 years of age, 68.9%
male, and had 6.3 years of professional work experience (Brown et al., 2005). After
Brown et al. conducted an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), principal factor analysis,
with an oblique rotation (direct oblimin), and scree plot, the eigenvalues showed one
primary factor accounted for 60.1% of the variation (Brown et al., 2005). Further
analysis and consultation with construct experts revealed the ELS could be reduced to a
10-item scale with little loss of explanatory power (Brown et al., 2005). Studies three
through six were conducted with the revised 10-item ELS. The tests included CFA and
discriminant analysis that contributed to the confirmation that the ELS had both construct
and discriminant validity. Study seven was conducted with the ELS and included
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structural equation modeling (SEM) for the analysis of in-group agreement. The results
indicated the ELS predicted several items, including the employees’ willingness to report
problems to leadership (Brown et al., 2005).

Ethics as a Predictor of Behavior
The literature on the relationship between ethics and safety performance has not
been clearly defined or well researched (Freiwald, 2013; Kapp & Parboteeah, 2008).
There is a belief that management has an ethical obligation to maintain safety (Erikson,
1997). Research has suggested that if employees believe that management values safety,
then safety performance is enhanced (Erikson, 1997). Other studies have asserted that
ethical climate has a strong influence on safety behavior (Kapp & Parboteeah, 2008).
Freiwald’s (2013) research showed a strong positive relationship between ethical
leadership and workplace injuries. The results of the survey and subsequent SEM
showed a statistically significant relationship between employees’ perceptions of ethics in
their company leadership and fewer injuries (Freiwald, 2013). Additionally, Brown,
Treviño, and Harrison’s ELS (2005) demonstrated the ability to predict the employee’s
willingness to discuss problems with organizational leadership (Brown et al., 2005).

Criterion or Self-Reported Outcomes
There are many studies in the literature that support the theory that safety climate
influences safety behavior, though some concerns exist about possible confounding
variables. Theoretically, the relationship between safety climate and safety behavior may
be caused by other factors such as the social exchange theory (Vroom, 1964) where the
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company’s concern for the employees is reciprocated through the employees trying to
provide value in return by adhering to safety policies or alternately, by the expectancyvalance theory where the employees want to participate in the safety program due to a
belief that it will lead to an outcome valuable to themselves (Neal & Griffin, 2006).
Additionally, there were other concerns in the literature about reverse causality in the
relationship between safety climate and safety behavior / safety performance, though the
reverse causality concerns were rejected by both Clarke (2006) and Neal and Griffin
(2006).
Despite the aforementioned concerns, there have been a series of safety climate or
safety culture studies that indicate a strong and statistically significant relationship
between safety climate or culture and safety behavior (Neal & Griffin, 2006; O’Toole,
2002). These results have led to an ongoing debate on the superiority of criterion-based
safety outcomes versus self-reported safety outcomes.
In 2000, Zohar wrote that safety climate research was being hampered by a lack
of criterion data (Zohar, 2000). Johnson’s study in 2007 supported the predictive validity
of safety climate as characterized by criterion data. More recently, both Freiwald (2013)
and Alsowayigh (2014) supported the concept that safety culture influenced directly or
indirectly self-reported injuries and safety performance, respectively. Both
methodologies have their merits and their issues. The concern with criterion-based
reports is that there is bias in the reporting, where many minor occurrences such as
smaller injuries or minor violations can go unreported, therefore tainting the results
(Thompson et al., 1998). These minor occurrences have the potential to be leading
indicators for a decline in safety performance, but only if reported (Thompson et al.,
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1998). Self-reported survey results on safety climate also may contain bias from the
respondents based on having been in an accident or witnessing one (Neal & Griffin,
2006).

Criterion Based Outcomes in Aviation

Figure 3. Safety Management Continuum. (Stolzer et al., 2011, p. 235).

There are several scholars such as Zohar and O’Connor et al. that support
quantitative criterion data superiority versus forms of data such as survey results from
self-reports of errors or violations. Zohar’s (2000) research on micro-accidents was
evidence of the predictive value of safety climate, though the researcher relied upon
smaller accidents that were properly documented. Thompson et al. (1998) suggests that
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many smaller accidents go unreported, which has the potential to bias future studies
without the controls employed by Zohar.
In Figure 3, Stolzer and Goglia’s Safety Management Continuum illustration
(Stolzer & Goglia, 2015, p. 2015) shows that in an SMS, many of the sources of data are
criterion based. Examples include data from flight data analysis / FOQA, most of the
predictive sources of data from data mining, probabilistic risk assessment, and modeling
are inherently criterion-based data that are quantitative and not self-reported. O’Connor
et al. also suggested FOQA would be a possible criterion data source for the prediction of
aviation accidents (O’Connor et al., 2011). Despite the potential benefits, FOQA data in
general aviation aircraft can be very expensive (Mitchell, Sholy, & Stolzer, 2007), and
the use of data from those devices would raise many privacy and autonomy concerns.
O’Connor, et al. stated the accident event rate in aviation is already too low to
generate valid predictive models based solely on accidents themselves (O’Connor et al.,
2011); therefore, aviation needs reliable and affordable measures of the deterioration of
safety performance before the chain of events that leads to accidents begins.

Criterion Measurement Variability and Reliability
Criterion, or hard quantitative based data, is unlikely to be comprised of
comparable measurements across diverse aviation organizations. The measurements of
parameters will be calibrated differently and therefore have different meaning from
organization to organization. For example, the accelerometer is designed to measure the
amount of gravity or g-forces applied to the aircraft upon landing. During one study
conducted by Cistone et al. (2011), many inconsistencies were discovered in the
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measurement of the g-forces experienced by one airline’s fleet. The variability of the
measurements, even within a single aviation organization, was such that it made it
difficult to derive valid results. Sources of variability included that accelerometers were
not all placed on the aircraft in the same location, the levels of calibration varied from
accelerometer to accelerometer, and the manufacturer of the accelerometers varied.
Additionally, the variation among aircraft types and the different levels of g-force
tolerance for those different types made cross comparisons of the importance of specific
g-force measurements significantly more difficult. This example illustrates the challenge
of deriving useful comparable data even when measurements were all conducted within
the same aviation organization. The same type of research, if attempted across many
diverse aviation organizations with over 100 different aircraft types, would suffer even
more from this problem. Therefore, a useful cross comparison of hard data on some
measures may be nearly impossible.

Self-Reporting Outcomes
Many studies have shown that safety climate either directly or indirectly
influences both self-reported and criterion-measured safety behavior. Alsowayigh (2014)
and Freiwald’s (2013) research results supported safety culture / climate and ethical
leadership as a viable mechanism to predict self-reported safety outcomes. Clarke (2006)
concluded that safety culture predicted safety performance, and safety performance was a
valid and generalizable predictor of accidents when accident involvement was measured
after the safety climate measurement.
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Consistent Methodology
O’Connor et al. (2011) have suggested as a best practice that researchers use
consistent measurements in order to compare results with similar themes. Yet, there are
few replicated studies in the literature conducted regarding safety culture and selfreported safety performance of different organizations such as Fractionals. This research
has the potential to re-confirm the relationship of safety culture, pilot commitment to
their organization, and safety performance of similar organizations. This cross
comparison would be an inexpensive measure to implement and monitor, yet the findings
could have a meaningful impact on improving safety in other U.S. jet FAR 135
companies.

Hypotheses
A structural equation model was used to evaluate the relationship among the
variables used in this study. Previous studies found in the extant literature were analyzed
to develop the conceptual framework for the model. This study augments previous work
by evaluating the relationship of safety culture with pilot commitment to the
organization, ethical leadership and self-reported safety performance. The assumptions
were based on the findings from the more recent studies by Alsowayigh (2014) and
Freiwald (2013), though the foundations of the assumptions date back to long established
constructs. The hypotheses shown in Figure 4 were tested in this research.
𝐻1 : A positive safety culture has a positive influence on pilot commitment to the
organization.
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Safety culture was found to have a direct and significant influence over pilot
commitment to the airline in the Alsowayigh (2014) study. This relationship is likely to
remain consistent with the pilots of the U.S. jet Fractionals.
𝐻2 : A positive safety culture has a positive influence on ethical leadership.
𝐻3 : A positive safety culture has a negative influence on safety performance.
The findings from Alsowayigh (2014) showed there was no significant direct
effect between safety culture and pilot error behavior. Previous research (Alsowayigh,
2014) has shown a significant and direct negative relationship between safety culture and
own attitude to violations. The same research also demonstrated the relationship between
safety performance and safety culture was not mediated by pilot commitment to the
airline (Alsowayigh, 2014). The relationship in this study is unlikely to be mediated by
the Fractional pilot commitment to the organization.
𝐻4 : A positive pilot commitment to the organization has a positive influence on
safety performance.
Previous research (Alsowayigh, 2014) has shown that pilot commitment to the
airline did not have a significant relationship with the pilot’s performance in the cockpit.
Alsowayigh (2014) suggested that safety performance in the cockpit was driven by their
professionalism as a pilot.
𝐻5 : A positive ethical leadership has a negative influence on safety performance.
Ethical leadership has been shown to be related to the safety outcomes
subcomponent of safety climate construct (Freiwald, 2013). This study has the potential
to find a relationship between ethical leadership and safety performance.
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𝐻6 : A positive ethical leadership has a positive influence on pilot commitment to
the organization.
Ethical leadership has been correlated to employee commitment to the
organization (Trevino et al., 1998). This study has the potential to find a relationship
between ethical leadership and pilot commitment to the organization.

Hypothesized SEM Model

H1

H4

H3
H6

H2

H5

Figure 4. Hypothesized SEM Model.

Summary
There exists a material gap in the literature of research focused on Fractional and
Charter jet operations. Fractional and Charter operations are dissimilar to airline
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operations in several key areas. One such area is the amount of airports served by
Fractional and Charter far exceeds those served by the airlines. This means that
Fractional and Charter operators often use second and third tier airports that have shorter
runways with less safety equipment and possibly no operating control tower. Another
area that is dissimilar to most airline operations many Fractional and Charter flights
encounter is autonomy. This means the pilots for many Fractionals and Charters perform
the majority of their duties autonomously without the benefit of direct supervision.
There is an opportunity to advance aviation research using consistent
methodologies (O’Connor et al., 2011) through the study of corporate jet operations.
There are distinct differences in the historical safety performance between Fractionals
and Charters despite operating under similar FAA regulations. This study determined a
baseline of safety culture and ethical leadership for the Fractionals. These baselines can
be used in future research to search for differences between Fractionals and Charters to
begin to draw inferences of causation. If causal inferences can be drawn and operational
changes enacted, the historical safety gap between these two groups can potentially be
narrowed. In addition to safety in corporate jets being enhanced, the lessons learned may
be applied to other sectors of aviation.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
A review of the available literature on safety culture, ethical leadership, and safety
performance supports that structural equation modeling (SEM) is an appropriate method
to determine the relationships among variables and is an effective means of investigating
the hypotheses of this study. Freiwald (2013) used this approach in the determination of
the relationship among ethical workplace climate, safety climate, and occupational
injuries. SEM was also employed by Alsowayigh (2014) when establishing the
relationship among safety culture, pilot commitment to the airline, and safety
performance.

Research Approach
SEM is a methodology that tests hypotheses in a confirmatory manner. The
underlying regression equations in SEM determine a structure to the relationships under
study and display these relationships graphically for better understanding. SEM tests
these hypothesized relationships simultaneously. If the model is adequate, the underlying
relationships may be determined to be both directional and possibly causal. SEM is used
for confirmatory analysis and not for exploratory analysis (Byrne, 2010).
The naming of the factors was based on the previous construct names used in the
literature, abbreviated due to the space constraints, and adapted for improved recognition.
As shown in Table 1, the exogenous variable is Safety Culture, and the endogenous
variables are Pilot Commitment to Aircraft Management Company (AMC), Ethical
Leadership, and Safety Performance.
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Table 1
Study Variables
Variable

Dimension

Abbreviation

Description

Exogenous Variable
Organizational
Commitment

OC

Operations
Personnel

OP

Informal
Safety System

IS

Safety
Culture

Formal Safety
System

FS

How the AMC values
safety and if the AMC
goes above and beyond
the minimum
requirements.
This evaluates AMC
personnel (chief pilot,
dispatch, trainers).
This evaluates the
support and
encouragement among
AMC pilots toward
safety.
This rates the safety
reporting and feedback
loop and AMC's safety
personnel.

Endogenous Variables
Ethical
Leadership

Ethical
Leadership

Pilot
Pilot
Commitment Commitment
to AMC
to AMC

Pilot Error
Behavior
Safety
Performance

Pilot Own
Attitude
Toward
Violations

EL

This evaluates the
perception of AMC
leadership's moral and
ethical behavior.

PC

This evaluates the
pilot's willingness to go
above and beyond for
the AMC.

ER

This is a self-report of
mistakes made by AMC
pilots during operations.

AT

This is a self-report of
AMC pilot's attitude
toward the regulations
and their willingness to
bend the rules.
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Design and Procedures
The survey instrument was modeled after the instrument in the Alsowayigh
(2014) study with minor adaptations to adapt from commercial aviation to general
aviation vernacular. The ELS was added to the end of the survey to preserve the question
order from the Alsowayigh (2014) study. The survey was constructed and facilitated in
Survey Monkey® online service. The Survey Monkey® online service was selected based
on previous studies found in the literature.
All pilots who were invited to take the research survey and allowed access to the
research survey were verified with FAA records to hold an Airline Transport Pilot
certificate (ATP), a current First Class Medical certificate, and a type rating consistent
with those aircraft types flown by U.S. Fractional companies. The prequalification
process (Pre-Qual) included verifying the credentials of each respondent before the
respondents were allowed access to the survey.
Prior to employment at Flight Options, Flexjet, and Net Jets, each pilot was
required to meet the aforementioned minimum pilot standards. Therefore, all Fractional
pilots on the union message boards met the Pre-Qual standard and were allowed
immediate access to the research survey.
A separate pre-qualification survey was set up in Survey Monkey® requiring
pilots who did not undergo the Pre-Qual process to provide their name, home town, level
of medical certificate, level of pilot certificate, and type ratings held. A research assistant
verified the credentials for each pre-qualification survey respondent with the FAA
database. If the respondent’s answers were not verified, the respondent was not sent the
research survey.

45
The Fractional pilots who were invited to take the research survey by direct mail
and ERAU alumni emails were pre-qualified by a research assistant prior to receiving the
invitation to participate. These pre-qualified pilots who opted to participate were allowed
immediate access to the research survey.
There were three other sources of pilots who volunteered to participate in the
research study. Aviation International News (AIN) has a bi-weekly newsletter that ran
three solicitations in its newsletter asking Fractional pilots to participate in a research
study. Of the estimated 1,000 plus Fractional pilots who may have seen the solicitation,
50 pilots were verified through the Pre-Qual process and invited to take the research
survey. Of the pilots who passed the Pre-Qual process, 37 completed the research
survey. This process was repeated in the Flight Safety Information (FSI) newsletter,
where 20 additional fractional pilots volunteered to participate, 8 pilots passed the PreQual process, and 6 pilots completed the survey. In addition to the newsletter
solicitations, a former Flight Safety Instructor for Net Jets invited several current Net
Jets’ pilots to take the survey. The pilots who responded were required to go through the
Pre-Qual process before taking the research survey.
All pilots who volunteered to participate were directed to an informed consent
form (see Appendix B) prior to taking the survey. The pilots who consented were
prompted to also confirm their position as a current Fractional pilot for a U.S. based
Fractional program. The survey was constructed to terminate if the pilot did not confirm
his or her current status as a pilot at a U.S. Fractional AMC. The pilots then continued to
the demographics portion of the survey and were then asked to provide their perceptions
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of their company’s safety culture, their own commitment to the organization, ethical
leadership qualities of their organization, and their safety performance.
The survey software was constructed to limit the pilots to one answer for each
item within the instrument. All incomplete surveys were excluded from the study. The
data received through the Survey Monkey® software were exported directly to IBM SPSS
23 software for further analysis. A confirmatory factor analysis and full structural
equation model were conducted with IBM AMOS 23.

Apparatus and Materials
The survey was facilitated electronically and could be taken on most smart
phones, tablets, or computers. The survey was developed, delivered, and data were
collected through the Survey Monkey® online platform. The survey consisted of 93 total
questions. The response to the first question determined if the respondent was qualified
to participate in the study. The subsequent five questions were demographic questions
referring to the primary aircraft flown, year of birth, company position, flight experience,
and tenure with the AMC. The remaining 87 questions were adapted from previously
validated surveys with necessary modifications to adapt from commercial aviation
vernacular to that of general aviation. The last question was added based on a question
inserted in the Alsowayigh (2014) research, and because it applied similarly to this study.

Population/Sample
The population of Fractional jet pilots in the United States, as shown in Table 2, is
estimated to be 3,660, with 3,425 of those pilots being unionized. This estimate is based
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on a ratio of 6.1 pilots per aircraft managed by the Fractional companies. These figures
are derived from the ratio of union members to aircraft managed by their respective
Fractional companies. NetJets is the largest Fractional company with 429 aircraft in the
United States (JetNet Fractional Program Summary, 2015) with an estimated 2,700 pilots.
Net Jets’ pilots are unionized, and an estimated 2,690 (99.8%) are represented by the Net
Jets Association of Shared Aircraft Pilots (NJASAP). Flight Options has 60 aircraft in
the United States with an estimated 385 pilots. Flight Options’ pilots are unionized with
an estimated 380 (99%) that are represented by the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters #1108. FlexJet was recently acquired by Flight Options and has 66 aircraft in
the United States with 350 pilots. FlexJet and Flight Options’ pilots voted to unionize in
December of 2015, and the FlexJet pilots became members of the Flight Options’ union
(IBT 1108). The remaining Fractional pilots are employed at Executive AirShare and
several small regional Fractional programs, which have an estimated total of 150
additional non-union Fractional jet pilots.

Table 2
Fractional Pilots in U.S.

Jets in
Union
*Pilots
Fleet
Members
NetJets
429
2,700
2,690
FlexJet
63
380
375
Flight Options
60
370
360
Executive Airshare
27
167
0
Others in U.S.
7
43
0
Total
586
3,660
3,425
* Estimated based on 6.1 average pilots per jet ratio
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The sampling frame consisted of an estimated minimum of 3,460 Fractional
pilots. There were the 3,425 union pilots who have access to their union message boards
plus an additional 35 Fractional pilots who were contacted directly through U.S. mail
(See Appendix F) or email. Each of the 3,460 pilots had a non-zero chance of
participating in the research survey. The sampling frame, therefore, consisted of 95.2%
or more of U.S. Fractional pilots. The remaining 4.8% (175 pilots) of Fractional pilots
may have seen the multiple invitations in both Aviation International News (AIN) alerts
and / or the Flight Safety Information Newsletter. Due to these newsletter invitations,
many of the remaining non-union Fractional pilots had a non-zero chance to participate in
the survey, therefore minimizing coverage error (Dillman et al., 2009).
The SEM methodology requires the sample size to vary with the complexity of
the model under study (Westland, 2010). Determination of the appropriate sample size
for the SEM model is non-trivial (Westland, 2010) and must meet the requirements
considered acceptable in the available literature. Presented in Table 3 are several
researchers and their suggested sample sizes based on the hypothesized SEM in this
study. This study has 87 observed variables and 10 latent variables with a targeted
significance level of .05 (p = .05), effect size of .1, and statistical power of .8. The
sample size based on the majority of the literature is 200 respondents or greater. The
current study has over 300 completed and valid responses (n = 305). The current study’s
sample size of 305 responses satisfies the requirements of Ding et al.’s (1995) (n = 150),
Kline’s (2005) (n > 200), and Boomsma & Hoogland (2001) (n > 200) as shown in Table
3.
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Table 3
SEM Sample Size Requirements

N: 100-150
N: > 200
N: > 200
N: 579 to 3,231

Researcher(s)
Ding, Velicer, and Harlow,
Kline
Boomsma & Hoogland
Westland

Year
1995
2005
2001
2010

Sources of the Data
The data used in this study were obtained through the online survey responses
received by pilots who volunteered to complete the survey. The survey is a compilation
of five different instruments. The survey questions seen by the respondents are displayed
in Appendix B.
The respondents from electronic solicitations were presented a link in a
newsletter, email, or on their union message board. The respondents from the post card
in Appendix F were directed to a web domain (www.safetyculturesurvey.org) that
connected them to the research survey. All respondents provided their informed consent,
shown in Appendix B, before advancing to the research survey. No direct emails of any
of the recipients were provided by any of the organizations targeted for this study. Union
members posted a direct link to the survey on their union message boards. Additional
controlled invitations were sent via direct email, email, a posted link on controlled
websites, or electronic newsletters.
Prior to conducting this research, initial training from the Collaborative
Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) was completed and an application was submitted
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to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. The
application received approval prior to start of data collection. The IRB approval letter is
presented in Appendix A.

Data Collection Device / Survey Design
The study included six demographic variables plus 87 observed variables (see
Appendix B) that represented ten constructs that were derived from five instruments that
had been used extensively in the literature. The instruments were:

Safety culture (SC). The Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS) was
developed and validated by Gibbons et al. (2006). Initially, the instrument was an 84
item scale that consists of five constructs; however, during validation, the instrument was
reduced to a 55 item scale with four constructs. Each question is measured using a 7point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The main
factors include organizational commitment (OC), operational personnel (OP), formal
safety systems (FS), and informal safety system (IS) (Gibbons et al. 2006).
Organizational commitment (OC) items include, “management expects pilots to push for
on-time performance, even if it means compromising safety.” Operational personnel
(OP) items include, management “inappropriately uses the MEL (e.g., use when it would
be better to fix equipment).” Formal safety systems (FS) items include, “the safety
reporting system is convenient and easy to use.” Informal safety system (IS) items
include, “management shows favoritism for certain pilots.”
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Pilot commitment to AMC (PC). The Organizational Commitment
Questionnaire (OCQ) was initially developed by Porter et al. (1974) and has two
versions: a long and short version. The long version has 15 questions and is multidimensional, whereas the short version, which is recommended by Commerias and
Fournier (2001), has 9 questions and is considered uni-dimensional. The questions are
measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree). Items include, “I talk up this organization to my friends as a great organization to
work for,” and this aircraft management company “inspires the best in me in the way of
job performance.”

Ethical leadership (EL). The ethical leadership scale (ELS) was developed by
Brown et al. (2005) and originally consisted of 48 items. After Brown et al. (2005)
conducted Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), the ELS was reduced to a 10 item
instrument. This instrument used a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5
(Strongly Agree). Items include, management “makes fair and balanced decisions” and
management “can be trusted.”

Pilots’ own attitude to violations (AT). The own attitude to violation scale was
developed by Fogarty (2004) as a self-reported scale and included nine items. These
items were measured on a 5-point Likert scale. Items include, “bending a procedure is
not the same as breaking it” (Fogarty, 2004).
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Pilot error behavior (ER). The error scale questionnaire was developed by
Fogarty (2004) and included three items. This survey was initially developed as a selfreported scale for airline maintenance personnel. Alsowayigh stated, “The questions are
general and can be applied to airline pilots” (Alsowayigh, 2014, p .38). The questions are
measured on a 5-point Likert scale. Items include, “I make errors in my job from time to
time” (Fogarty, 2004).

Construct Validity
The items in the study were measured to confirm they represented the latent
constructs they were expected to measure based on the available literature (Hair et al.,
2010). The four components of construct validity are Convergent, Discriminant, Face,
and Nomological (Hair et al., 2010). The model diagnostics of each component was
tested in this study.
The five instruments selected to create the composite instrument in this research
have all have been used repeatedly in the literature. Each instrument has had its construct
validity demonstrated in the literature, and many of these instruments have been used in
multiple studies.

Convergent validity. There are several measures used to estimate the convergent
validity of the items in a research study (Hair et al., 2010). The factor loadings and
average variance extracted (AVE) were each checked in the model (Hair et al., 2010).
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The AVE is a summary measure of convergent validity, and the formula is shown
in Figure 5. The standardized factor loadings for each item on each construct were
squared and then a construct average variance was established (Hair et al., 2010).

𝑛

∑

AVE =

𝑖=1

𝜆2𝑖

𝑛

Figure 5. Average Variance Extracted (Hair et al., 2010).

Reliability. Reliability was tested using Cronbach’s alpha (1951). Before
inclusion in the study, each of the five instruments employed to create the composite
survey was previously tested for internal consistency. In each case, the instruments used
in this study satisfied the minimum suggested value of .7 (Hair et al., 2006) as measured
by Cronbach’s alpha (1951), with the exception of the pilot error scale, which had been
measured at .6 in one study (Fogarty, 2004).
In recent SEM studies, construct reliability (CR) has been tested by comparing the
square of the summed standardized factor loadings with the error variances (Hair et al.,
2010) for each factor as shown in Figure 6. CR values over .7 suggest good reliability
(Hair et al., 2010).
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Figure 6. Construct Reliability Formula (Hair et al., 2006, p. 777).

Discriminant validity. The discriminant validity is a measure by which each
construct is truly distinct (Hair et al., 2010). This is tested through a comparison of the
variance-extracted percentages of two constructs with the squared correlation between the
two constructs. (Hair et al., 2006). Kline (2005) suggested that a model has discriminant
validity if no two factors have correlations higher than .85.

Nomological & face validity. Nomological validity was analyzed by reviewing
the correlations between the constructs to determine if they made sense (Hair et al.,
2010). The face validity was analyzed by a review of the content of the items in each
construct to ensure they measured what was intended. Face validity of the items of each
construct was also analyzed by two experienced general aviation pilots. These two pilots
had a combined experience of more than 40 years and had both been employed in a
Fractional program.

Treatment of the data
Demographic Data. Descriptive statistics were computed from the survey data
based on pilot tenure at the AMC, weight of equipment flown, position, and age. The
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pilot demographic data were also collected for potential inclusion in future research to
compare group differences.

Missing data. The survey was constructed to require one answer for each
question prior to continuing the survey. A not applicable choice was not presented in the
instrument. All 52 incomplete responses were excluded from the analysis; therefore,
there were no surveys with missing data used in the study.

Outliers. The Mahalanobis distance (D2) was calculated for each of the variables
searching for significant outliers. The literature suggests that outliers should be retained
unless their retention is particularly detrimental to the model (Hair et al., 2006). The
model was tested with and without the outliers, and the model fit deteriorated with the
outliers removed. The determination was made to retain all significant outliers in the
model.

Normality. Multivariate normality was analyzed with particular consideration for
kurtosis because SEM is sensitive to kurtosis (Byrne, 2010). In the assessment of
multivariate normality, items that were determined to be more than slightly skewed
(>1.0) or kurtotic (> 7.0) (Byrne, 2010) were evaluated. The content of these non-normal
items was reviewed and a determination of their importance to the model was made.
Items that were non-normal, contributed little to the model, and their temporary removal
benefitted the model fit were permanently removed from the study.
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)
CFA was used to confirm the latent variables for each of the 10 factors in the
model (Byrne, 2010). The CFA was conducted with IBM SPSS AMOS 23 software in
order to validate the measurement model and confirm the factors measured as intended
(Byrne, 2010). The model was checked for covariance, outliers, and cross-loading.
Model re-specification was conducted by changing one item per iteration.
The model was evaluated using Normed Fit Index (NFI), Goodness of Fit Index
(GFI), Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Root Mean
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), and normed Chi-square (CMIN/df) (Byrne,
2010). According to Vandenberg and Scarpello (1990), the fitness of a model should be
analyzed with more than one fitness index, so the NFI, GFI, AGFI, CFI, RMSEA, and
CMIN/df were used in the present study.
The first analysis of model fit was conducted with the Normed Fit Index (NFI).
The NFI is a non-centrality based index (Byrne, 2010) that tests the hypothesized model
against the null hypothesis (Byrne, 2010). If the NFI analysis returns a value close to .95
(Byrne, 2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999), it is considered a good fit, with values from .90 to
.949 still considered acceptable. The NFI has been known to underestimate fit in smaller
sample sizes (Byrne, 2010); therefore, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) was also used to
evaluate the model fit.
The subsequent analysis of model fit was conducted with both the Goodness of
Fit Index (GFI) and the Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI). The GFI measures the
relative amount of variance and covariance in the sample data that the hypothesized
model can explain (Byrne, 2010). The GFI was developed to be less sensitive to large
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sample sizes (Hair et al., 2006). The AGFI is very similar, except that the AGFI accounts
for the degrees of freedom in the model (Byrne, 2010). If the GFI and AGFI indices are
greater than .9 (> .9), then model fit is considered acceptable (Hair et al., 2006). The
closer the value is to 1.0, the better the fit (Byrne, 2010; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993)
Additional analysis of model fit was conducted with the comparative fit index or
CFI which, like the NFI, is a non-centrality based index (Byrne, 2010) that tests the
proposed model against the null hypothesis (Byrne, 2010). The CFI is chosen frequently
in studies because it demonstrates insensitivity to model complexity (Hair et al., 2010).
As with the NFI, if the CFI analysis returns a value close to .95 or greater, it is considered
a good fit (Byrne, 2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999). If the CFI returns values from .90 to .949,
the fit is still considered acceptable.
A further metric employed was the Root Mean Square of Error Approximation
(RMSEA). The RMSEA is considered a badness of fit index, which means that lower
values indicate a better fitting model (Byrne, 2010). RMSEA is recommended for studies
with a large number of observed variables because other 𝜒 2 Goodness of Fit (GOF) test
statistics tend to reject acceptable models with a large number of observed variables, such
as the current study (Hair et al., 2010). A value of the RMSEA of .6 or below is
considered a good fit for the data (Byrne, 2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999).
The final fit metric was the 𝜒 2 statistic (CMIN/df), which computes the model’s
distance from a theoretically perfectly fitted model divided by the degrees of freedom
(Hu & Bentler, 1999). The lower the CMIN/df value is, the better the model fitness. The
chi-square is sensitive to sample size (Hair et al., 2006). The CMIN/df is a comparative
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ratio and is considered to be acceptable if value is below three (Byrne, 2010; Hair et al.,
2006).

Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)
The model did not achieve the fit criteria in Table 10; therefore, an EFA was
conducted on the data (Byrne, 2010). A principal component analysis (PCA) was
conducted with Varimax rotation. The PCA was chosen because the results were
considered easier to interpret. The PCA is designed to reduce the number of variables
down to the items that explain the largest amount of variance in a given model (Grimm et
al., 2000). An oblique rotation was considered due to its advantage with cross-loading
items (Hair et al., 2006); however, the Varimax rotation was selected because it was more
frequently chosen in the safety culture and safety climate literature, such as Freiwald’s
(2013) study.
The EFA was run, and the Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) measure of sampling
adequacy was analyzed (Hair et al., 2006). This is the measure of the ratio of squared
correlations between variables and the partial squared correlations between variables.
KMO measures above .9 (> .9) are considered very good (Field, 2009).
The Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) was analyzed for the appropriateness
of conducting an EFA. All variables (> .5) were considered appropriate (Hair et al.,
2005). The variables below .5 were removed from the model, and the model was re-run.
The EFA was conducted with IBM SPSS 23 software. All factors that returned
eigenvalues greater than 1.0 (> 1.0) and had a contribution percentage of greater than 1%
(> 1%) of the variance in the model (Grimm et al., 2000) were analyzed. The EFA
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results displayed many more than the eight first order factors in the proposed model;
therefore, after evaluation, the model was re-run with a constraint for seven factors. The
seven-factor constraint was chosen based on grounded theory to reduce the complexity in
the model. All items with similar factor loadings on multiple factors were evaluated for
removal. Factors with no basis in grounded theory were analyzed for removal from the
study.

Model 2 (M2) Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)
The CFA was conducted on M2 model. Based on a review of the available
literature, the M2 constructs were evaluated against the validated instruments chosen for
the study. Based on grounded theory of the latent factor structure, items that were
loading near or below .7 (Hair et al., 2006), non-normal, or loading on a latent factor not
supported by previous studies were evaluated for removal.

Post hoc analysis. Post hoc analysis was conducted based on the Modification
Indices (MIs). Model re-specification is by nature exploratory because the researcher is
re-specifying the hypothesized model for methods to improve the model (Byrne, 2010).
A model with good fit indices and also with high MIs can be an indication of multicollinearity in the model (Kline, 2005) rather than causal significance. MIs were
reviewed, and those that exceeded 5.00 were co-varied when on the same factors.
The CFA for the M2 required additional regressions constraints on each of the
items in the ERN and ATN constructs. Hair et al. (2006) recommend the use of at least
three items for each factor when the sample size is below 300 (n < 300). There is a
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concern that factors with less than three items will not have the appropriate level of
degrees of freedom to determine a solution that fits the data (Hair et al., 2006). The
current research study had over 300 (n = 305) completed and valid responses; therefore,
additional regression constraints were added before conducting the SEM.

Structural Equation Model & Hypotheses Testing
The previously mentioned model fit indices were re-evaluated by comparing them
to the model fit in the final CFA and additionally to the fit criteria in Table 10. The
model fit in SEM was similar to the final CFA and met all the criteria in Table 10. The
AGFI was the only fit criteria below the target level (> .9). As previously stated, it was
determined to be acceptable.
The six hypotheses were evaluated by reviewing the SEM regression weights,
standardized estimates, and p values. The analysis was conducted using IBM SPSS
AMOS 23 software. The maximum likelihood estimation was employed for the analysis
(Byrne, 2010). The elimination of the PC factor in the EFA precluded the testing of three
of the six hypotheses. The model fit was determined to be adequate, and the remaining
three hypotheses were tested.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
This study explored the relationship between Safety Culture, Ethical Leadership,
Pilot Commitment to the AMC, and Safety Performance. Based on the available
literature, a model was developed to determine the effect of Safety Culture on Ethical
Leadership, Pilot Commitment, and Safety Performance. Additionally, the effect of
Ethical Leadership on Safety Performance was also tested.
This chapter shows the results of the CFA on the proposed model, subsequent
EFA, final CFA, and SEM. The model fit history of the CFA is shown with nine
revisions in Table 12 and the SEM model fit shown in Table 14. The results of the
hypothesis testing are included in this chapter. The descriptive statistics for each of the
items is displayed in Appendix C. The SC & PC constructs were measured on a sevenpoint Likert scale. The remaining constructs of ER, AT, and EL were each measured on
a five-point Likert scale.

Demographic Data
Three hundred fifty-seven respondents participated in the research survey; all
respondents completed the survey electronically. Table 4 shows there were 305 (n = 305)
complete and valid responses used in the study, representing 8.3% of the estimated 3,660
Fractional jet pilots in the United States.
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Table 4
Completed Responses

Source
Direct Mail to Prequalified Pilots
NJASAP Message Board
FlexJet/FO Message Board
Aviation International News
Embry-Riddle Alumni Email
Flight Safety Instructor
Curt Lewis Newsletter
Total

Estimated
Views
1,759
2,660
780
1,000
249
180
160
6,788

Pre-Qual
All
All
All
50
All
9
8

Completed
Surveys
111
80
46
37
16
9
6
305

Percentage
36.4%
26.2%
15.1%
12.1%
5.2%
3.0%
2.0%

Table 5 shows the pilots’ ages ranged from 28 years old to 74 years old,
representing a range of 46 years between the youngest and oldest pilot. The median age
was 49, and the mean age was 49.14 years old. The proximity of the mean age to the
median age of the data showed the age data was not skewed. The mode was 43 years of
age.

Table 5
Pilot Age (Years)

20-29 years
30-39 years
40-49 years
50-59 years
60-69 years
70-79 years
Total

Frequency
1
37
131
97
35
4
305

Percentage
0.3%
12.1%
42.9%
31.8%
11.5%
1.3%

Cumulative
Percentage
0.3%
12.5%
55.4%
87.8%
98.7%
100.0%
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The most frequent position held by 54.8% of the respondents was Pilot In
Command (PIC), often called Captain, followed by First Officer or Second in Command
(SIC), which represented 27.8% of the respondents. Table 6 shows there were 15.4% of
pilots who were Captains with additional duties such as Check Airman, and 2% of the
respondents were part of the management team at the AMC.

Table 6
Position at AMC

0-4 years
5-9 years
10-14 years
15 or more years
Total

Frequency
11
39
121
134
305

Percentage
3.6%
12.8%
39.7%
43.9%

Cumulative
Percentage
3.6%
16.4%
56.1%
100.0%

The type of equipment flown by the pilots in Table 7 was split evenly among
Light Jet (29.5%), Mid-Sized Jet (25.6%), Super Mid-Sized Jet (24.3%), and Large Jets
& Long Range Jets (20.7%). The data contained a well-balanced mix of pilots flying a
wide range of equipment.
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Table 7
Aircraft Type Flown (Max Takeoff Weight)

Frequency
Light Jet (up to 19,999 lbs)
Mid-sized Jet (20,000 29,999 lbs)
Super Mid-sized Jet
(30,000 - 39,999 lbs)
Large Jet (40,000 - 49,999
lbs)
Long Range (50,000 lbs or
greater)
Total

Percentage

Cumulative
Percentage

90

29.5%

29.5%

78

25.6%

55.1%

74

24.3%

79.3%

32

10.5%

89.3%

31
305

10.2%

100.0%

Table 8 shows the majority of respondents (51.5%) had over 10,000 hours of
flight experience with 27.5% having between 7,500 and 9,999 hours of flight experience,
18.7% had between 5,000 and 7,499 hours, and just 2.3% had below 5,000 hours. In
contrast to commercial pilots, general aviation pilots do not accumulate flight hours at the
same pace; therefore, having the majority of pilots with over 10,000 hours of flight
experience is uncommonly high for a general aviation organization.
Table 9 shows that 3.6% of respondents had been with their AMC less than 5
years, 12.8% had been with their AMC between 5-9 years, 39.7% between 10-14 years,
and 43.9% had been with their respective AMC for 15 years or more. The tenure with
the AMC indicates that the Fractional pilots that completed the survey stay with their
respective companies for many years.
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Table 8
Pilot Experience (Hours)

Frequency

Percentage

Cumulative
Percentage

2,500 - 4,999 hours

7

2.3%

2.3%

5,000 - 7,499 hours

57

18.7%

21.0%

7,500 - 9,999 hours

84

27.5%

48.5%

10,000 hours or more

157

51.5%

100.0%

Total

305

Table 9
Tenure at AMC

0-4 years
5-9 years
10-14 years
15 or more
years
Total

Frequency
11
39
121

Percentage
3.6%
12.8%
39.7%

134
305

43.9%

Cumulative
Percentage
3.6%
16.4%
56.1%
100.0%

Normality & Outlier Checks
The outliers were checked by analyzing the Mahalanobis D2. There were 57 cases
that were considered outliers that were significant to the .05 level (p < .05). The model
fit was checked with the outliers, and the model fit indices were CMIN/df = 1.777, NFI =
.715, GFI = .669, AGFI = .649, CFI = .85, and RMSEA = .051. After the outliers were
removed, the model fit indices deteriorated with CMIN/df = 1.704, NFI = .701, GFI =
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.637, AGFI = .615, CFI = .849, and RMSEA = .053. The outliers were retained in all
future models.
The multivariate normality was analyzed, and it was determined there were
several variables that had a skewness over 1.0 and/or a kurtosis greater than 7.0 (See
Appendix C). The content of the items was reviewed, and items critical to the model
were retained. ER62 (3.844) (I make errors in my job from time to time.) and ER64
(4.553) (I have made errors that have been detected by other pilots.) had acceptable,
though noticeably high kurtosis values. The content of both questions led to one
common answer; therefore, kurtosis was to be expected, and the items were retained.
The remaining non-normal items were retained until the CFA was conducted and the
model fit analyzed. If an item was determined to have a combination of loading below .5
(< .5) (Hair et al., 2006) and high skewness or kurtosis, it was temporarily removed from
the model. If the model fit improved after the item was removed, and it was determined
that the content of the item was not critical to the model, it was removed permanently
from the model.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis
In Figure 7, the proposed CFA factor structure is shown with OC, OP, FS, IS, PC,
EL, AT, and ER. The proposed model consists of the original 55 items of the CASS
(Gibbons et al., 2006). The CASS was hypothesized to have a four-factor structure (OC,
OP, FS, IS) with a second order factor for SC. The 9 items of Porter et al.’s PC scale
(1974), 10 items from the Brown et al. (2005) ELS, and Fogarty’s (2004) Maintenance
Environment Survey comprised the items in both AT and ER.
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Figure 7. Proposed CFA Model.

The proposed model had model fit indices of CMIN/df = 2.019, NFI = .675, GFI
= .626, AGFI = .605, CFI = .803, and RMSEA = .058 as displayed in Revision 1 of Table
12. The CMIN/df and RMSEA were considered acceptable as shown in the fit criteria in
Table 10; however, the GFI of .626 was less than the .90 targeted fit criteria, AGFI of
.605 was less than .90 targeted fit criteria, and CFI of .803 was less than .95 targeted fit
criteria (Hair et al. 2006). The Modification Indices (MIs) were checked for values over
20. For each of the MI values over 20 that loaded on the same factor, a covariance was
established. There were 20 iterations conducted, and the model fit improved, though the
model fit remained unacceptable. The model fit indices were CMIN/df = 1.777, NFI =
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.715, GFI = .669, AGFI = .649, CFI = .85, and RMSEA = .051. The model was then
tested with the outliers removed from the data. After outliers were removed, the model
fit further deteriorated with CMIN/df = 1.704, NFI = .701, GFI = .637, AGFI = .615, CFI
= .849, and RMSEA = .053. The outliers were returned to the data and remained in the
model.

Table 10
Fit Criteria
Model Fit Fit Criteria
CMIN/df 1.399 below 3.00
NFI
0.939 close to 0.95
GFI
0.905 close to 1.00
AGFI
0.879 close to 1.00
CFI
0.982 close to 0.95
RMSEA
0.036 less than 0.60

Reference
Acceptable
(Byrne, 2010; Hair et al., 2006)
Yes
(Byrne, 2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999)
Yes
(Byrne, 2010; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993)
Yes
(Byrne, 2010; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993)
Yes
(Byrne, 2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999)
Yes
(Byrne, 2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999)
Yes

The items with low factor loadings (< .4) were removed from the model (Byrne,
2010). There were 14 additional model revisions conducted to improve the model fit.
The model fit improved, though the model fit remained unacceptable with values of
CMIN/df = 1.778, NFI = .77, GFI = .705, AGFI = .683, CFI = .884, and RMSEA = .051.
The model fit for the proposed model was determined to be unacceptable based on the
target model fit indices in Table 10. It was determined that an exploratory factor analysis
(EFA) should be conducted based on the poor model fit.
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Exploratory Factor Analysis
The measurement model was analyzed with the survey data collected, and the
model fit remained unacceptable due to a poor model fit indices. An EFA was initiated
on the full dataset. Before the EFA was conducted, the data was confirmed to meet the
assumptions for an EFA. A review of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling
Adequacy (KMO) showed that it was strong at .953. The Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity
was significant (p < .000). The Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) was analyzed.
After the removal of one item (A93); the MSA was determined to be satisfactory because
a review of the Anti-Image Matrix showed all items were above .5 (>.5). The KMO also
improved to .965 after the removal of item A93.
Based on Hair et al. (2010), a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) with
Varimax rotation was conducted on all items. The initial result showed the items loading
on 16 different factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 which explained 68.3% of the
variance in the model.
Based on the proposed model developed from the research conducted by
Alsowayigh (2014) and Brown et al. (2005), the PCA was run again with a factor
constraint of seven. The scree plot in Figure 8 shows the results of the CFA with the
constraint of seven factors. The eigenvalues, located in Appendix D1, shows the seven
factor model explained 67.959% of the variance in the model. The first component was
named Safety Culture New (SCN), and it consisted of 24 items from the original Safety
Culture (SC) second order factor. The second component was named Ethical Leadership
Pilot Commitment (ELPC) due to 13 of the 18 items coming from the previous factors of
Ethical Leadership and Pilot Commitment to the AMC (PC). The remaining five items
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were from SC. The third factor was labeled Pilot Commitment New (PCN) with four low
loading items exclusively from the previous PC factor. The fourth component consisted
of three low loading items from SC and PC. The fifth component was labeled Reporting
(REP) and consisted of two items from the original SC factor. The sixth component was
labeled Safety Performance 1 (SP1), which consisted of five items from the original
Attitude To Violations (AT). The seventh component was labeled Safety Performance 2
(SP2) and consisted of five items from ER and AT.

Figure 8. EFA Final Scree Plot.

After reviewing the loadings below .7 (< .7) alongside item content, further model
revisions were made. The third factor (PCN) was removed because the average loading
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was (below .7) .573, with 25% of the items cross-loading to ELPC. Factor 4 was
removed due to low average loading of .566. Factor 5 (REP) was also removed due to
poor average factor loading of .573. Additionally, several items were removed with low
loading (below .6) or cross-loading concerns. Cross-loading concerns arise when one
item has similar loading values on multiple components; this may cause model fit and
discriminant validity issues. Items with cross-loading issues were reviewed and removed
from the model.
The original PC factor was eliminated from the model due to poor factor loading
and cross-loading concerns. The elimination of PC reduced the hypotheses in the study
from six to three. The remaining factors shown in Table 11 were SCN (20 items), ELPC
(11 items), ATN (2 items), and ERN (2 items). The model could still test hypotheses H2,
H3, and H5.

Table 11
Model Factors for Hypothesis Testing
Proposed Model
Second
Order
First Order
Factors
OC
OP
SC
FS
IS
EL
PC
AT
SP
ER

Model 2 (M2)
Post EFA
Factors

Final
Factors

SCN

SCN

ELPC

ELN

SP1

NFP
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis Model 2 (M2)
Model 2 (M2) was analyzed with the survey data collected and the model fit
improved from the model fit in the CFA conducted prior to the EFA; though the model fit
shown in Table 12 was still not acceptable with CMIN/df = 2.237, NFI = .865, GFI =
.793, AGFI = .766, CFI = .92, and RMSEA = .064. The M2 was checked for normality,
and five items were slightly skewed with skewness values above 1.0. There was one item
(OP31) with a skewness of 1.3 that was removed from the model after review of the
content. Two items (ER62, ER64) had elevated kurtosis values (> 7.0). After a review of
the content, it was determined the format of both items led to a justifiable common
answer; therefore, the items remained unchanged in the model. A review of the
Mahalanobis D² values indicated there were 57 cases where the respondents’ answers
were outliers and were significant (p < .05). The model was checked with the outliers
removed and the model fit eroded; therefore, the outliers remained in the model
permanently.
The M2 went through four additional iterations to improve the model fit with
CMIN/df = 1.93, NFI = .885, GFI = .828, AGFI = .804, CFI = .941, and RMSEA = .055.
The model fit remained unacceptable. The proposed factor structure in the literature was
reviewed, and based on grounded theory, the ELPC factor was reduced to more closely
match the original EL factor. The items loading from the former factors of SC and PC
(PC75, IS48, IS49) were deleted from the ELPC construct. ELPC was renamed ELN and
maintained 80% of the items from the EL construct. After the deletion of these three
items in ELPC, the model fit continued to improve with CMIN/df = 2.026, NFI = .891,
GFI = .837, AGFI = .812, CFI = .941, and RMSEA = .055.
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Three additional items with standardized estimates below .65 were removed from
the model, and the overall fit improved with CMIN/df = 2.059, NFI = .903, GFI = .848,
AGFI = .766, CFI = .947, and RMSEA = .059. The CMIN/df increased slightly from
2.026 to 2.059, and the RMSEA increased from .055 to .059, though both values were
still considered good after the items were removed.

Table 12
CFA Model Fit History
Revision CMIN/df NFI
1
2.019
0.675
2
1.777
0.715
3
1.778
0.770
4 (M2)
2.237
0.865
5
1.930
0.885
6
2.026
0.891
7
2.059
0.903
8
1.390
0.940
9
1.399
0.939

GFI
0.626
0.669
0.705
0.793
0.828
0.837
0.848
0.906
0.905

AGFI
0.605
0.649
0.683
0.766
0.804
0.812
0.822
0.880
0.879

CFI
0.803
0.850
0.884
0.920
0.941
0.941
0.947
0.982
0.982

RMSEA
0.058
0.051
0.051
0.064
0.055
0.058
0.059
0.036
0.036

The MIs were analyzed further and adjustments were made to co-vary appropriate
error terms that exceeded 4.0. The standardized regressions were analyzed for each of
the subsequent 29 model revisions to improve the model fit. The final model fit values
were CMIN/df = 1.39, NFI = .94, GFI = .906, AGFI = .88, CFI = .982, and RMSEA =
.035. According to Byrne (2010), each of the model fit values were acceptable. The
AGFI = .88 remained marginal, though concerns with the AGFI under-reporting in
complex models similar to the model in this current study allowed for the AGFI to be
deemed acceptable.
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In Figure 9, the final factor structure is shown with SCN, ELN, and NFP, which is
a second order factor comprised of ERN and ATN. The final M2 model consists of one
first order factor for SCN, which is made up of 17 of the original 55 items of the Gibbons
et al. (2006) CASS. The CASS was hypothesized to have a four-factor structure with a
second order factor for SC. ELN is made up of 80% of the items from the Brown et al.
(2005) ELS. The PC factor was completely removed. The NFP second order factor
consists of the remaining four items from the original 12 items in Fogarty’s (2004)
Maintenance Environment Survey. A Heywood case (Hair et al., 2006) was discovered
in the CFA model. The regression weights for the ERN and ATN were equalized (Hair et
al., 2006) to allow for the model to run properly.

Figure 9. Final CFA Model.
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Construct Reliability
Each factor was analyzed for construct reliability (CR) using the formula in
Figure 6. The CR values for the factors in the model were SCN = .905, ELN = .945,
ATN = .919, and ERN = .795. Due to reverse worded items, SCN values were converted
to absolute numbers prior to calculating the CR value. The factors in this model all have
achieved acceptable construct reliability with values greater than .7 (> .7) (Hair et al.,
2010). The Cronbach’s alpha (1951) for the factors were SCN = .911, ELN = .950, ATN
= .903, and ERN = .788.

Convergent Validity
Convergent Validity was calculated using the Average Variance Extract (AVE)
by taking the standardized factor loading squared for each item in each factor and then
calculating the average. The AVE values for the factors in the model were SCN = .599,
EL = .710, ATN = .823, and ERN = .650. According to Hair et al. (2010), any factors
with an AVE greater than .5 are considered to have convergent validity; therefore, all the
factors in the final model had convergent validity.

Discriminant Validity
Discriminant Validity was assessed using two methodologies. The first, shown in
Table 13, was assessed by comparing the squared factor correlations with the AVE for
each factor. The AVE for SCN = .599, and the squared correlations between SCN and
EL = .677, SCN and ERN = .024, and SCN and ATN = .063. The AVE for ELN = .710,
and the squared correlations between SCN and ELN = .677, ELN and ERN = .012, and
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ELN and ATN = .079. The AVE for ERN = .650 and the squared correlations between
ERN and SCN = .024, ERN and ELN = .012, and ERN and ATN = .011. The AVE for
ATN = .823 and the squared correlations between ATN and SCN = .063, ATN and ELN
= .079, and ATN and ERN = .011. According to Hair et al. (2010), discriminant validity
within the model was confirmed between all factors except between SCN and ELN. A
subsequent methodology was employed to confirm discriminant validity between SCN
and ELN. According to Kline (2005), correlations below < .85 are considered to have
discriminant validity. The correlation between SCN and ELN was below .85 at .824;
therefore, the model has discriminant validity (Kline, 2005).

Table 13
Discriminant Validity Test
Factor

AVE.

Squared Correlations
Confirmed
0.677
(SCN:ELN)
N*
SCN
0.599
0.024
(SCN:ERN)
Y
0.063
(SCN:ATN)
Y
0.677
(ELN:SCN)
Y
ELN
0.710
0.120
(ELN:ERN)
Y
0.079
(ELN:ATN)
Y
0.024
(ERN:SCN)
Y
ERN
0.650
0.120
(ERN:ELN)
Y
0.011
(ERN:ATN)
Y
0.063
(ATN:SCN)
Y
ATN
0.823
0.079
(ATN:ELN)
Y
0.011
(ATN:ERN)
Y
*Discriminant validity confirmed with alternate
methodology
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Structural Equation Model
The SEM displayed in Figure 10 shows the proposed relationships of SCN on
ELN, SCN on NFP, and ELN on NFP. Due to the removal of the PC factor, three other
hypotheses were no longer testable in the study and were removed from the SEM.

Figure 10. Final SEM Model.

Table 14 shows the model fit values for the SEM were acceptable with CMIN/df
= 1.387, NFI = .94, GFI = .906, AGFI = .881, CFI = .982, and RMSEA = .036. (Hair et
al., 2010). These model fit values are similar to the final CFA and as mentioned
previously, determined to be acceptable.
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Table 14
Final SEM Model Fit
Revision CMIN/df NFI
SEM
1.399
0.939

GFI
0.905

AGFI
0.879

CFI
0.982

RMSEA
0.036

The results of the EFA reduced the number of factors in the proposed model from
eight first order factors to four. The proposed model consisted of four first order factors
(FS, IS, OP, OC) loading onto one second order factor SC. After the EFA, SC was
reduced to one first order factor renamed SCN. SCN is one first order factor made up of
17 of the original 55 items from SC. Of the seventeen items, eight items were from OC,
five items were from OP, four items were from FS, and zero items remained from IS.
Two of the items from IS loaded onto the ELPC factor; however, after review of the
extant research, the two IS items were removed from the factor ELPC. ELPC was renamed ELN after the removal of two IS (IS48, IS49) items and removal of one PC item
(PC75).
PC was eliminated from the model due to low to moderate loading and crossloading on many different factors. The factor was determined to no longer be testable;
therefore, it was eliminated. This elimination of PC from the model precluded the testing
of Hypotheses H1, H4, and H6 in the SEM model.
The 33% in ER and 78% in AT factors led to the renaming of the SP second order
factor to NFP (Not Follow Procedures) based on the content of the items remaining. EL
was reduced by 20% and was renamed ELN in the final model.
In Figure 10, the final factor structure is shown with SCN, ELN, and NFP, which
is a second order factor comprised of ERN and ATN. The final SEM model tests the
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direct relationship between SCN on ELN (𝐻2 ), SCN on NFP (𝐻3 ), and ELN on NFP
(𝐻5 ).

Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 1
𝐻1 A positive Safety culture has a positive influence on pilot commitment to the
organization.
This hypothesis can no longer be tested due to the elimination of the PC factor
during the EFA.

Hypothesis 2
𝐻2 : A positive safety culture (SCN) has a positive influence on ethical leadership (ELN).
As shown in Table 15, this hypothesis is supported.

Table 15
SEM Hypothesis Testing

DIR VAR Std Est

S.E.

C.R

P

Supported

H1

VAR
n/a

H2

ELN

<--- SCN

0.824

0.036

11.565

***

Yes

H3

NFP

<--- SCN -0.330

14.910

-1.442

0.149

No

H4

n/a

H5

NFP

<--- ELN -0.317

30.471

-1.327

0.184

No

H6

n/a
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The results of the SEM analysis confirmed the relationship between SCN and
ELN was both strong (Estimate = .824) and significant (p < .001). This study supports
that there is a significant relationship and positive relationship between SCN and ELN.

Hypothesis 3
𝐻3 : A positive safety culture (SCN) has a negative influence on safety performance
(NFP).
As shown in Table 15, this hypothesis is not supported. The results of the SEM
analysis determined SCN does not have a negative influence on NFP, and that
relationship is not significant. The relationship between SCN and NFP did not
materialize as hypothesized; the relationship between SCN and NFP had a significance
level of .149.

Hypothesis 4
𝐻4 : A positive pilot commitment to the organization (PC) has a positive influence on
safety performance (NFP).
This hypothesis could no longer be tested due to the elimination of the PC factor
during the EFA.

Hypothesis 5
𝐻5 : A positive ethical leadership (ELN) has a negative influence on safety performance
(NFP).
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As shown in Table 15, this hypothesis is not supported. The results of the SEM
analysis confirmed ELN had a non-significant (p = -.184) and negative relationship to
NFP. This result was unexpected based on a review of the literature.

Hypothesis 6
𝐻6 : A positive ethical leadership (ELN) has a positive influence on pilot commitment to
the organization (PC).
This hypothesis can no longer be tested due to the elimination of the PC factor
during the EFA.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study analyzed the relationship between safety culture (SC), ethical
leadership (EL), pilot commitment to the AMC (PC), and safety performance (SP) for
U.S. based Fractional jet pilots. The proposed factor model structure derived from the
literature could not attain an adequate model fit during the initial CFA; therefore, an EFA
was conducted. After the EFA, a second CFA was conducted on M2 followed by the
development and testing of a SEM. The SEM developed allowed for hypothesis testing
based on the new factor structure.
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the results of the study and how these
results compare with the findings in the available literature. Additionally, this chapter
will interpret these results, discuss how these results may impact general aviation in the
future, and discuss recommendations for future research.

Discussion
Hypotheses. There were six hypotheses planned for this research study. After
the EFA, three (H1, H4, H6) of the six hypotheses could no longer be tested due to the
removal of the PC factor.
(𝐻1 ) A positive safety culture has a positive influence on pilot commitment to the
organization. This hypothesis (𝐻1 ) could not be tested because of the low and cross
loading of the PC items as a stand-alone factor.
(𝐻2 ) A positive safety culture (SCN) has a positive influence on ethical
leadership (ELN). This hypothesis was tested and supported. The results showed H2 had
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both a significant (p =.001) and strong (estimate = .824) relationship. These results
confirm Schein’s (2004) assertion that corporate culture is intertwined with
organizational leadership. The high correlation and the inability to confirm one of the
two discriminant validity tests performed between the SCN and ELN constructs suggest a
deep relationship between ELN and SCN. One of the important revelations in this study
is that in Fractional pilots there exists a strong correlation between ELN and SCN. There
is a need for discrimination between these two constructs to better understand how to
measure, monitor, and improve them respectively, if needed. Many studies have
concluded that both EL (Freiwald, 2013) and SC (Alsowayigh, 2014) influence the safety
of an organization, though the current study did not confirm those conclusions.
As noted above, the current study results do not match Freiwald’s (2013) findings
that ethical leadership (EL) did not have a significant relationship with proactive safety
climate. Freiwald’s (2013) reasoning suggested that EL is merely a subset of the larger
construct of leadership, and Freiwald stated that the narrowness of the EL construct might
explain the lack of a relationship in the 2013 study (Freiwald, 2013). Additionally, the
Freiwald study included EL as the exogenous variable and safety climate as the
endogenous variable, whereas the present study reverses the direction of that relationship.
(𝐻3 ) A positive safety culture (SCN) has a negative influence on safety
performance (NFP). The SEM analysis showed that H3 is not supported, and SCN does
not have a significant influence on NFP. This result was unexpected due to the support in
previous studies (Alsowayigh, 2014; Fogarty, 2004) showing a significant relationship
between safety culture or safety climate and self-reported safety performance. Due to the
infrequency of aviation accidents or incidents potentially leading to invalid conclusions
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(O’Connor et al., 2011), the current study relied on self-reported safety behavior as did
Alsowayigh (2014) and Fogarty (2004). In contrast, research by Zohar (2000) relied on
quantitative outcome variables, such as employee micro-accidents. This micro-accident
research also concluded there was a significant relationship between safety climate and
safety performance. Zohar hypothesized that micro-accidents were a leading indicator to
a decline in safety climate that could lead to larger accidents. General aviation needs to
develop a methodology that includes identifying and monitoring quantifiable data that is
considered a leading indicator of a decline in safety to augment self-reported data.
Future research should continue to test the relationship between SCN and NFP
because the results are likely to be more consistent with past research from Alsowayigh
(2014), Fogarty (2004), and Zohar (2000). Freiwald (2013) suggested that the
narrowness of the EL construct in the 2013 study was a potential cause for the
unexpected lack of support for the relationship between EL and employee injuries. In the
current study, the major reduction in the SP items from 13 original items to 4 items could
have also narrowed the NFP construct in a similar manner, thereby altering the
significance of the relationship.
(𝐻4 ) A positive pilot commitment to the organization (PC) has a positive
influence on safety performance (NFP). Alsowayigh (2014) found that PC did not
mediate the relationship between ER and AT. Alsowayigh (2014) also determined that
PC did not influence a professional pilot’s behavior in the cockpit. The inability of the
PC items to maintain integrity as a factor combined with the results of previous research
suggests that PC is not essential for future research attempting to predict pilot safety
behavior.
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(𝐻5 ) A positive ethical leadership (ELN) has a negative influence on safety
performance (NFP). The SEM results did not support that positive ELN reduces the
likelihood of pilots not following procedures (NFP). In 1998, Craig and Gustafson
(1998) warned managers that ethical leadership should be a priority. The study by Kapp
and Parboteeah (2008) concluded that ethical climate had a strong influence over safety
behavior. Freiwald (2013) concluded that ethical leadership led to fewer occupational
accidents. The present study did not match these other studies and did not support the
construct that ethical leadership plays a significant role in safety behavior and outcomes.
There is ample evidence in the literature suggesting that future studies continue to test the
relationship between ELN and safety behaviors. The positioning of ELN as the
exogenous variable in future studies is likely to influence the level of significance
between ELN and safety behaviors.
(𝐻6 ) A positive Ethical leadership (ELN) has a positive influence on pilot
commitment to the organization (PC). This hypothesis (𝐻6 ) could not be tested because
of the low, cross, and sporadic loading of the PC items during the EFA.

Conclusions
This study analyzed the relationship between safety culture (SCN), ethical
leadership (ELN), and safety performance (NFP). Schein (2004) stated that corporate
culture was the personality of the organization and that corporate culture was strongly
connected with leadership and employee behavior (Schein, 2004). James Reason (1997)
wrote that when employees of an organization hold similar beliefs, those beliefs will
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govern behavior. In 1979, Butler warned that leaders who distanced themselves from
tasks may contribute to accidents.
The present study tested the nature of this relationship between safety culture and
ethical leadership. It was concluded that SCN and ELN had a strong and significant
relationship. In addition to this strong and significant relationship, these two factors were
also highly correlated. The constructs of SCN and ELN also had discriminant validity
concerns based on one conservative test of discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2010). The
cross-loading of many of the items between the SC and EL factors also suggested a
strong relationship between the constructs.
In the perceptions of the Fractional pilots, the constructs of SC and EL are closely
related. Stolzer et al. (2015) confirmed this by suggesting the need for safety mandates to
have the complete support of the company leadership. Though these findings re-confirm
the conclusions by other studies and subject matter experts, there exists a new concern
about the ability to discriminate between the two constructs in future research. If SC and
EL are so closely perceived by Fractional pilots, the construct of SC may be too wide and
the CASS too broad in scope. The CASS did not retain the expected factor structure and
lost 69% of the original items during the study of Fractional pilots. In contrast to the
CASS, the ELS (Brown et al., 2005) was concise, and 80% the items remained together
throughout the EFA and multiple CFA processes.
The unexpected result from this study was the non-significant relationship
between SCN and NFP. Research from Alsowayigh (2014), Fogarty (2004), and Zohar
(2000) supported that safety culture or safety climate has a significant effect on safety
performance. The number of items in the second order factor SP in the proposed model
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was reduced from 13 items to 4 (NFP) in the final model. It is plausible that this
narrowing of the items may have affected this relationship. Future research is
recommended, as it is likely to re-confirm the research from Alsowayigh (2014), Fogarty
(2004), and Zohar (2000) that safety culture or safety climate influences safety
performance or safety behavior.
The positioning of the ELN factor as the exogenous variable in the recommended
future model shown in Figure 11 is likely to influence the significance of these
relationships. The shifting of the ELN scale to the exogenous position is also consistent
with the SEM model presented in the Freiwald (2013) research.

Contributions to the Literature
This study contributed to the literature by re-confirming several previous studies
and opening the discussion to re-examine the validity and reliability of four survey
instruments in the literature.
This research supports the O’Connor et al. study (2011) which concluded that, in
aviation, there are too many different instruments attempting to measure similar
constructs, and called for future studies to begin confirming the reliability and
discriminant validity of the existing instruments rather than testing new instruments. The
O’Connor et al. (2011) study stated that studies are needed that re-confirm both the
predictive ability of the instruments and their discriminant validity from other constructs.
In the current study with Fractional pilot data, the factor structure of most of the
instruments used did not maintain their proposed factor structure during the EFA. This
lack of factor structure integrity causes a concern that these instruments will not maintain
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their integrity when tested on various aviation groups in future research. As suggested by
O’Connor et al. (2011), confirming predictive capability from unreliable instruments will
not be possible. Additionally, if the constructs cannot maintain their discriminant validity
from other constructs when measured together, the results will be difficult to interpret,
easily challenged, and have little practical benefit.
The CASS (Gibbons et al., 2006) was a very broad instrument and the proposed
factor structure did not hold up to the Fractional pilot survey data. The CASS had four
first order factors with one second order factor for SC. The post EFA structure was
reduced to one first order factor (SCN). It may be argued the CASS was originally
designed for commercial airline pilots; therefore, the questions were developed for a
different pilot group. During this research, there were only minor adaptations needed for
the CASS to be applicable to Fractional pilots. The survey was tested with multiple
experienced pilots before deployment. Fractional companies and airlines in the U.S. both
operate very large fleets and face many of the same challenges. Both pilot groups are
mostly unionized; therefore, the CASS should be adaptable to the Fractional pilot group.
The CASS, in the form used for this study, was arguably overly complex and too
large in scope for this research. The items in the CASS overlapped with other
instruments in the study; however, the main concern was the factor structure was not
maintained with the data from the Fractional pilots. The result of the first EFA showed
16 components with eigenvalues over 1.0 that explained 68% of the variance in the
model. The subsequent EFA was constrained to seven factors that explained 67.959% of
the variation in that model. The final three components from the EFA model constrained
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to seven components, made up just 7% of the remaining variance; therefore, those items
would have added minimal value to the study had they been retained.
Of the original 55 items in the CASS, only 17 items were retained in the final
model due to low, cross, and sporadic loading. This major reduction in the CASS items
due to cross-loading combined with the high correlation with the ELN construct suggests
the CASS is a comprehensive survey instrument and is likely broader in scope than the
construct of safety culture. In Appendix E, the 17 remaining CASS items are presented
for consideration for the measurement of SCN for future research on pilot groups similar
to Fractional pilots. The aviation industry needs to agree on a standard set of instruments
that measures the intended construct and maintains both reliability and discriminant
validity. This set of instruments must also possess the ability to predict declines in safety
behavior or the instruments will be of minimal value.
The prediction of safety performance should be forecasted from a combination of
qualitative and quantitative data. Survey data may reveal the perception of a decline in
safety culture which could be the antecedent to a decline in safety performance. The
weakness in qualitative data is that self-reported survey data have the potential to be
biased by the respondent. Conversely, accurately compiled quantitative data can provide
unbiased data that can forecast a decline in safety performance. The weakness in
quantitative data can be the inability to accurately measure or interpret the data. The
weaknesses in both qualitative and quantitative measurements should compel safety
practitioners to rely on a combination of both qualitative and quantitative data to forecast
declines in safety performance.
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Study Limitations
The data collected in the study was collected through the voluntary participation
of Fractional jet pilots in the U.S. The responses by the participants were based on their
perception of ELN, SCN, and NFP. The perceptions of the Fractional pilots may have
been affected by the challenges between the unions and management during the data
collection process. NJASAP completed their negotiation of a new collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) after years of negotiations in December 2015. Flight Options pilots
had been unionized for many years while Flexjet pilots were non-union. After the merger
of Flight Options and Flexjet, there was a vote to continue a company-wide union or
disband the union. The union passed by a narrow margin. The total affirmative votes
were less than the number of existing Flight Options union members; therefore, many
union members did not vote for the union. The results were so close they were
challenged by Flight Options / Flexjet management.
Each of the aforementioned issues had the potential to influence the responses
provided by the Fractional pilots. Additionally, these situations could have influenced
which pilots were motivated to participate in the survey. Nearly all of the Fractional
pilots in this study were protected by their respective unions; therefore, they would have
been able to answer the questions in this study without fear of repercussions.
One limitation included the inability to confirm the discriminant validity between
ELN and SCN in one of two tests of discriminant validity conducted. According to the
more conservative method from Hair et al. (2010), the AVE for each factor should be
higher than the squared correlation between factors. The AVE of SCN was .599;
however, the squared correlation between SCN and ELN was .677. In an alternative
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method for confirming discriminant validity, the correlation coefficient between SCN and
ELN did pass the standard set by Kline (2005) of <.85 with a correlation of .824. Based
on the extensive existing literature demonstrating the factors as distinct and achieving
Kline’s (2010) <.85, both SCN and ELN were retained. The relatively high correlation
and inability to confirm discriminant validity by one methodology may have been due to
the broad scope of questions in the CASS and the question content being similar between
these factors. Several of the original CASS items loaded better on the ELPC variable
than the SCN during the CFA.
In the final revisions of the CFA and the SEM, there was a negative variance
discovered in the model. This issue was determined to be a Heywood case and may have
been caused by the M2 not meeting the suggested minimum of three items loading on
ATN and three items loading on ERN (Hair et al., 2006). The solution suggested by Hair
et al. (2006) was to equalize the regression weights in the model for the ATN and ERN
items. The ATN items were both set to 1.0 and the ERN items were both set to .005, and
the issue was resolved. The model fit worsened from revision 8 to revision 9 by a
minimal amount as shown in Table 12.

Practical Implications
The practical implication of this research may be far reaching for general aviation
and for AMCs. New and inexpensive survey programs can be implemented and
monitored that could improve the understanding of the relationship between the AMC
and their pilots. Additionally, these monitoring programs may prove to have the ability
to predict a decline in safety behavior.
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The conclusion that SCN predicts ELN should encourage AMCs to monitor these
factors within their organizations. The implementation of a survey-based measurement
program is inexpensive and easy to both implement and interpret. A survey-based
measurement program may also be considered part of the requirement for their AMC’s
SMS to continually improve safety (Stolzer & Goglia., 2015). The AMC would be able
to identify and react to any declines in the SCN and or ELN. This identification and
reaction has the potential to improve the organization’s culture and relationship with their
pilots. A positive safety culture and a positive perception of leadership have been
demonstrated in other studies to reduce accidents and improve safety behavior.
The other important implication of this research is that AMC owners and
organizational leaders may realize their leadership is an important aspect for both the
financial success and the safety of their organization. Brown et al. (2005) stated that if
leaders are attractive, credible, and legitimate, they will govern employee’s behavior.
Schein (2004) stated that a strong positive culture leads to better financial performance.
This research study concluded that SCN and ELN are highly correlated and, therefore,
both are of critical importance to the success of the organization. The leaders of AMCs
must be ethical and strong leaders who create a just and blame free organization that
encourages open communication. AMC leaders must be committed to safety initiatives
to realize any long-lasting effects of their efforts (Helmreich et al., 1997). Strong and
ethical AMC leaders may enjoy a financially sound and safe operation.
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Future Research
O’Connor et al. (2011) called for the repeated use of common survey instruments
that could withstand rigorous discriminant validity and predict reliable results. This
study re-confirmed the need for survey instruments that can be applied across different
groups and maintain both construct integrity and discriminant validity. In aviation, there
needs to be a reliable instrument or small set of instruments that are open for use across
diverse groups. This common group of survey instruments needs to have the ability to
detect a decline in safety behavior or their antecedents early enough to implement
solutions before these declines become safety issues.
The IS, PC, and AT items used from the literature did not load strongly on their
hypothesized factors and, therefore, may not be reliable instruments for future research
with Fractional pilots or similar groups, or the questions would need to be revised.
Future instruments need to be concise and measure the intended construct efficiently.
The IS, PC, and AT factors may not provide enough benefit for future studies on similar
pilot groups.
Future research may include the following alternative SEM model based on the
existing literature from Brown et al. (2005) and Freiwald (2013). The Brown, Treviño, &
Harrison (2005) and Freiwald (2013) studies suggested ethical leadership has an
influence on safety behavior and outcomes. These studies suggest that future research
may be conducted with ethical leadership or the wider construct of leadership as the
exogenous or predictor variable in a causal model with safety culture and safety
performance as the endogenous variables. The following model for future SEM research

94
has the potential for strong and significant relationships of both hypotheses (see Figure
11).

Figure 11. Proposed Future SEM Model.

Conducting the revised study on similar pilot groups with varying historical safety
records may yield actionable group differences. The Fractional companies have achieved
a superior safety record when compared with Charter operators; therefore, conducting the
same study for random Charter pilots in the U.S. has the potential to both test the revised
model and identify group differences. If significant, these group differences may lead to
strategies to improve general aviation safety.
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Future studies should include a reliable and quantifiable data source to augment
the self-reporting data. Zohar’s study (2000) used quantifiable data as the endogenous
variable from which to draw conclusions. Zohar has advocated the use of quantifiable
data such as micro-accidents as the endogenous variable in a safety climate research. In
general aviation, the accident and incident rates are so low that drawing valid conclusions
about antecedents to accidents and incidents may not be valid (O’Connor, 2011). In an
unpublished study using quantifiable data in commercial aviation, Cistone et al. (2011)
encountered issues with the reliability and validity of the accelerometer measurements for
hard landings at one Middle Eastern airline. The accelerometers had both measurement
errors and instrument calibration issues across the fleet that made drawing conclusions
from the data difficult.
Self-reported data will remain an important part of aviation safety due to
infrequency of accidents and or incidents; however, augmenting survey data with reliable
and quantifiable data would be recommended to create a more comprehensive
methodology to predict declines in aviation safety. In 2000, Zohar used micro-accidents
to illuminate declines in safety before more serious accidents could occur. The Quick
Access Recorder (QAR) installed in many aircraft, records operational data, such as pilot
inputs. This QAR data can be analyzed and used as an indication that safety is declining.
For example, in May 2014, a G-IV crashed while departing Bedford, MA (KBED). In its
report, the NTSB reviewed the QAR data and determined the crew had not performed a
proper check of the flight controls on 89.8% of the previous 176 flights (NTSB AAR15/03, 2015). If the QAR data had been monitored, it would have demonstrated this
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crew’s disregard for standard pre-flight checks, and corrective actions could have been
implemented that would have likely prevented this accident.
Finally, the instruments used in aviation need to be more reliable, freely available
for use in other studies, and must maintain discriminant validity when used with other
instruments. These instruments need to be concise and measure the intended construct.
Without the open and repeated use of a distinct and reliable instrument or a small set of
instruments, aviation is unlikely to realize the potential benefits of forecasting a decline
in safety behavior. Reliable forecasting of declines in safety behavior has the potential to
prevent catastrophic aviation accidents.
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Safety Culture & Performance Survey
Consent for Participation in Survey Research

I am 18 years or older and volunteer to participate in a research study conducted by Kevin O’Leary
(Ph.D. Candidate) from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. I understand that the study is
designed to gather information about Safety Culture in Fractional Jet Pilots. I will be one of
approximately 300-700 pilots completing this survey.
1. My participation in this project is voluntary. I understand that I will not be paid for my
participation though a donation to the Corporate Angel Network will be made for each completed
survey.
I may withdraw and discontinue participation at any time without penalty. If I decline to participate
or withdraw from the study, no one will be told.
2. I understand that most respondents will find the survey questions interesting and thoughtprovoking. If, however, I feel uncomfortable in any way during the survey, I have the right to end the
survey.
3. Participation involves completing an anonymous 93 question online survey. The survey takes an
average of 13 minutes and can be completed on a most devices with an internet connection
including smart phones (landscape view), tablets or computers.
4. I understand that the researcher will not know my identity and I will not be asked to provide any
identifiable data about myself. My confidentiality as a respondent in this survey will remain secure.
Subsequent uses of records and data will be subject to standard data use policies which protect
the anonymity of individuals and institutions.
5. No organization, institution or company (except the principal researcher) will have access to the
raw responses. This precaution will prevent my individual responses from having any negative
repercussions.
6. I understand that this research study has been reviewed and approved by the Institutional
Review Board (IRB) for the use of Human Subjects in Research at the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University. For research problems or questions regarding subjects, the Institutional Review Board
may be contacted through:
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David C. Ison, Ph.D. Research Chair
Assistant Professor of Aeronautics College of Aeronautics
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Worldwide
Editor, International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace Office
(Cell): (503) 507-5697
email: isond46@erau.edu Skype: david.ison73
Website: http://worldwide.erau.edu

7. If requested, I will be given a copy of this consent form.

8. I have read and understand the explanation provided to me. I have had all
my questions answered to my satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to
participate in this study. My continuation with this survey will serve as
confirmation of my consent to participate in this study.
Thank you very much for your participation in this important study. Principal
Investigator
Kevin O’Leary Ph.D. Candidate
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University olearyk1@my.erau.edu
617-600-6868
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Safety Culture & Performance Survey
Survey Introduction

* 1. Are you currently a jet pilot at a one of the following U.S. based fractional Aircraft Management
Companies (AMCs)?
(NetJets, Flight Options, Flexjet or Executive AirShare)
Yes
No

Definition:
Aircraft Management Company (AMC) refers to the organization that operates and manages aircraft while maintaining an operating
certificate such as FAR 135 / Charter or FAR 91K / Fractional.
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Demographic Information

Demographic Information
* 2. What best describes your position within the Aircraft Management Company (AMC)? (Select one,
please)
Pilot with Office / Management responsibilities
Pilot with other responsibilities (Instructor, Check Airman, etc.)
Pilot (Captain / PIC)
Pilot (First Officer / SIC)

*

3. What category of aircraft based on Maximum Takeoff Weight (MTOW) do you primarily fly?
Light Jet (up to 19,999 lbs)
Mid-sized Jet (20,000 - 29,999 lbs)
Super Mid-sized Jet (30,000 - 39,999 lbs)
Large Jet (40,000 - 49,999 lbs)
Long Range (50,000 lbs or greater)

* 4. How many total hours of pilot experience do you have?
0 - 2,499 hours
2,500 - 4,999 hours
5,000 - 7,499 hours
7,500 - 9,999 hours
10,000 hours or more
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* 5. How long have you worked for this Aircraft Management Company (AMC)?
0-4 years
5-9 years
10-14 years
15 or more years

* 6. What year were you born?
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* 7. Safety is a core value in my Aircraft Management Company (AMC).
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 8. Management is more concerned with making money than being safe.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

* 9. Management expects pilots to push for on-time performance, even if it means compromising safety.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 10. Management doesn't show much concern for safety until there is an accident or an incident.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 11. Management does not cut corners where safety is concerned.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree
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* 12. Checklists and procedures are easy to understand.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 13. My Aircraft Management Company's (AMC's) manuals are carefully kept up to date.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 14. My Aircraft Management Company (AMC) is willing to invest money and effort to improve safety.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 15. My Aircraft Management Company (AMC) is committed to equipping aircraft with up-to-date technology.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 16. My Aircraft Management Company (AMC) ensures that maintenance on aircraft is adequately
performed and that aircraft are safe to operate.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree
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* 17. Management goes above and beyond regulatory minimums when it comes to issues of flight safety.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 18. Management schedules pilots as much as legally possible; with little concern for pilots' sleep schedule or
fatigue.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 19. Management tries to get around safety requirements whenever they get a chance.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 20. Management views regulation violations very seriously, even when they don't result in any serious
damage.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree
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* 21. Chief pilots do not hesitate to contact line pilots to proactively discuss safety issues.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 22. Chief pilots are unavailable when line pilots need help.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

* 23. As long as there is no accident or incident, chief pilots don't care how flight operations are performed.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 24. Chief pilots have a clear understanding of risks associated with flight operations.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

* 25. Pilots often report safety concerns to their chief pilot rather than the safety officer (safety department).
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree
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* 26. Dispatch consistently emphasizes information or details (e.g., weather requirements, NOTAMs) that
affect flight safety.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 27. Dispatch inappropriately uses the MEL (e.g., use when it would be better to fix equipment).
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 28. Dispatch is responsive to pilots' concerns about safety.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

* 29. Dispatch would rather take a chance with safety than cancel a flight.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree
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* 30. Instructors/trainers have a clear understanding of risks associated with flight operations.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 31. Safety is consistently emphasized during training at my Aircraft Management Company (AMC).
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 32. Instructors/trainers teach shortcuts and ways to get around safety requirements.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

* 33. Instructors/trainers prepare pilots for various safety situations, even uncommon or unlikely ones.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree
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* 34. The safety reporting system is convenient and easy to use.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 35. Pilots can report safety discrepancies without fear of negative repercussions.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

* 36. Pilots are willing to report information regarding marginal performance or unsafe actions of other pilots.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 37. Pilots don't bother reporting near misses or close calls since these events don't cause any real
damage.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 38. Pilots are willing to file reports about unsafe situations, even if the situation was caused by their own
actions.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree
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*
* 39. Safety issues raised by pilots are communicated regularly to all other pilots in this Aircraft Management
Company (AMC).
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 40. When a pilot reports a safety problem, it is corrected in a timely manner.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

* 41. Pilots are satisfied with the way this Aircraft Management Company (AMC) deals with safety reports.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 42. My Aircraft Management Company (AMC) only keeps track of major safety problems and overlooks
routine ones.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree
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* 43. Personnel responsible for safety hold a high status in the Aircraft Management Company (AMC).
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 44. Personnel responsible for safety have the power to make changes.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

* 45. Personnel responsible for safety have a clear understanding of the risks involved in flying the line.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 46. Safety personnel have little or no authority compared to operations personnel.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

* 47. Safety personnel demonstrate a consistent commitment to safety.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree
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* 48. Management shows favoritism to certain pilots.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 49. Standards of accountability are consistently applied to all pilots in this organization.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 50. When pilots make a mistake or do something wrong, they are dealt with fairly by the Aircraft
Management Company (AMC).
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 51. When an accident or incident happens, management immediately blames the pilot.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree
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* 52. Pilots are seldom asked for input when Aircraft Management Company (AMC) procedures are
developed or changed.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 53. Pilots are actively involved in identifying and resolving safety concerns.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

* 54. Pilots who call in sick or fatigued are scrutinized by the chief pilot or other management personnel.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 55. Pilots have little real authority to make decisions that affect the safety of normal flight operations.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 56. Management rarely questions a pilot's decision to delay a flight for a safety issue.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree
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* 57. Pilots view the Aircraft Management Company's (AMC's) safety record as their own and take pride in it.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 58. Pilots who don't fly safely quickly develop a negative reputation among other pilots.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 59. Pilots with less seniority are willing to speak up regarding flight safety issues.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

* 60. Decisions made by senior pilots are difficult to challenge.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

* 61. Pilots don't cut corners or compromise safety regardless of the operational pressures to do so.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree
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* 62. I make errors in my job from time to time.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 63. Workload pressures have at times affected the quality of my work.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree

* 64. I have made errors that have been detected by other pilots.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree
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* 65. I will say something if my peers (other pilots) take shortcuts.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 66. I will say something if my supervisor takes shortcuts.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree

* 67. "Gut instincts" can be used in lieu of the publications and manuals.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree

* 68. There are better ways of performing a task than those described in the publications and manuals.
Neither disagree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 69. There are better ways of performing a task than those described in the company operations manuals.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 70. Bending a procedure is not the same as breaking it.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

\

Disagree

disagree

127

* 71. Shortcuts, in order to get a task done, are still violations of procedures.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 72. Reporting mistakes helps other people learn from them.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree

* 73. Personnel should be encouraged to report their mistakes.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree
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* 74. I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in order to help this Aircraft
Management Company (AMC) be successful.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 75. I talk up this Aircraft Management Company (AMC) to my friends as a great organization to work for.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 76. I would accept almost any type of pilot assignment in order to keep working for this Aircraft
Management Company (AMC).
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 77. I find that my values and the Aircraft Management Company's (AMC's) values are very similar.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 78. I am proud to tell others that I am part of this Aircraft Management Company (AMC).
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree
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* 79. This Aircraft Management Company (AMC) really inspires the best in me in the way of job performance.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 80. I am extremely glad I chose this Aircraft Management Company (AMC) to work for over others I was considering at the
time I joined.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 81. I really care about the fate of this Aircraft Management Company (AMC).
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

* 82. For me, this is the best of all Aircraft Management Companies (AMCs) for which to work.
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Somewhat

Neither agree nor

disagree

disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree

Strongly agree
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* 83. Company managers conduct their personal lives in an ethical manner.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 84. Company management defines success not just by results but also the way that they are obtained.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 85. Company management listens to what employees have to say.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree

* 86. Company management disciplines employees who violate ethical standards.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 87. Company management makes fair and balanced decisions.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree

* 88. Company management can be trusted.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree
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* 89. Company management discusses business ethics or values with employees.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 90. Company management sets an example of how to do things the right way in terms of ethics.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Agree

Strongly agree

* 91. Company management has the best interests of employees in mind.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree

* 92. When making decisions, company management asks "what is the right thing to do?"
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree

Agree

Strongly agree
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* 93. I am more likely to make judgement errors in abnormal or emergency situations.
Neither agree nor
Strongly disagree

Disagree

disagree

Agree

Strongly agree
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Thank you!

The principal researcher, Kevin O'Leary thanks you for taking the time to complete this survey.
A donation to the Corporate Angel Network will be made for each completed survey.
Thank you very much!
Kevin
O'Leary
617-6006868
olearyk1@my.erau.edu
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APPENDIX C
Tables
C1

Descriptive Statistics
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Table C1
Descriptive Statistics
Skewness
Item
OC7. Safety is a
core value in my
Aircraft
Management
Company (AMC).

N

Std.
Min Max Dev

Kurtosis

Std.
Var. Statistic Error Statistic

Std.
Error

305

1

7

1.58 2.50

-1.59

0.14

2.04

0.28

OC8.
Management is
more concerned
with making
money than being
safe.

305

1

7

1.94 3.75

0.36

0.14

-1.21

0.28

OC9.
Management
expects pilots to
push for on-time
performance, even
if it means
compromising
safety.

305

1

7

1.84 3.37

0.80

0.14

-0.61

0.28

OC10.
Management
doesn't show
much concern for
safety until there
is an accident or
an incident.

305

1

7

1.79 3.21

0.87

0.14

-0.45

0.28

OC11.
Management does
not cut corners
where safety is
concerned.

305

1

7

1.88 3.52

-0.14

0.14

-1.33

0.28

OC12. Checklists
and procedures are
easy to
understand.

305

1

7

1.31 1.72

-1.34

0.14

1.32

0.28

136
OC13. My
Aircraft
Management
Company's
(AMC's) manuals
are carefully kept
up to date.
OC14. My
Aircraft
Management
Company (AMC)
is willing to invest
money and effort
to improve safety.
OC15. My
Aircraft
Management
Company (AMC)
is committed to
equipping aircraft
with up-to-date
technology.
OC16. My
Aircraft
Management
Company (AMC)
ensures that
maintenance on
aircraft is
adequately
performed and
that aircraft are
safe to operate.
OC17.
Management goes
above and beyond
regulatory
minimums when it
comes to issues of
flight safety.

305

2

7

1.02 1.04

-1.68

0.14

3.75

0.28

305

1

7

1.31 1.71

-1.08

0.14

1.42

0.28

305

1

7

1.51 2.27

-0.89

0.14

0.32

0.28

305

1

7

1.59 2.52

-0.88

0.14

-0.10

0.28

305

1

7

1.53 2.35

-0.65

0.14

-0.38

0.28
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OC18.
Management
schedules pilots as
much as legally
possible; with
little concern for
pilots' sleep
schedule or
fatigue.
OC19.
Management tries
to get around
safety
requirements
whenever they get
a chance.
OC20.
Management
views regulation
violations very
seriously, even
when they don't
result in any
serious damage.
OP21. Chief pilots
do not hesitate to
contact line pilots
to proactively
discuss safety
issues.
OP22. Chief pilots
are unavailable
when line pilots
need help.
OP23. As long as
there is no
accident or
incident, chief
pilots don't care
how flight

305

1

7

1.80 3.23

-0.66

0.14

-0.74

0.28

305

1

7

1.76 3.11

0.64

0.14

-0.65

0.28

305

1

7

1.33 1.76

-0.94

0.14

0.56

0.28

305

1

7

1.72 2.97

-0.50

0.14

-0.75

0.28

305

1

7

1.54 2.36

1.03

0.14

0.28

0.28

305

1

7

1.74 3.02

1.00

0.14

-0.14

0.28
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operations are
performed.
OP24. Chief pilots
have a clear
understanding of
risks associated
with flight
operations.
OP25. Pilots often
report safety
concerns to their
chief pilot rather
than the safety
officer (safety
department).
OP26. Dispatch
consistently
emphasizes
information or
details (e.g.,
weather
requirements,
NOTAMs) that
affect flight
safety.
OP27. Dispatch
inappropriately
uses the MEL
(e.g., use when it
would be better to
fix equipment).
OP28. Dispatch is
responsive to
pilots' concerns
about safety.
OP29. Dispatch
would rather take
a chance with
safety than cancel
a flight.

305

1

7

1.43 2.06

-1.15

0.14

0.85

0.28

305

1

7

1.65 2.71

-0.12

0.14

-0.95

0.28

305

1

7

1.83 3.34

-0.27

0.14

-1.11

0.28

305

1

7

1.84 3.38

0.07

0.14

-1.23

0.28

305

1

7

1.47 2.16

-1.01

0.14

0.43

0.28

305

1

7

1.73 2.99

0.69

0.14

-0.64

0.28
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OP30.
Instructors/trainers
have a clear
understanding of
risks associated
with flight
operations.

305

2

7

1.15 1.33

-1.24

0.14

1.51

0.28

305

2

7

1.14 1.30

-1.31

0.14

1.78

0.28

305

1

7

1.01 1.02

1.95

0.14

5.60

0.28

305

1

7

1.29 1.67

-1.20

0.14

1.30

0.28

FS34. The safety
reporting system
is convenient and
easy to use.

305

1

7

1.37 1.88

-1.25

0.14

1.20

0.28

FS35. Pilots can
report safety
discrepancies
without fear of
negative
repercussions.

305

1

7

1.38 1.90

-1.66

0.14

2.68

0.28

OP31. Safety is
consistently
emphasized
during training at
my Aircraft
Management
Company (AMC).
OP32.
Instructors/trainers
teach shortcuts
and ways to get
around safety
requirements.
OP33.
Instructors/trainers
prepare pilots for
various safety
situations, even
uncommon or
unlikely ones.
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FS36. Pilots are
willing to report
information
regarding
marginal
performance or
unsafe actions of
other pilots.
FS37. Pilots don't
bother reporting
near misses or
close calls since
these events don't
cause any real
damage.
FS38. Pilots are
willing to file
reports about
unsafe situations,
even if the
situation was
caused by their
own actions.
FS39. Safety
issues raised by
pilots are
communicated
regularly to all
other pilots in this
Aircraft
Management
Company (AMC).
FS40. When a
pilot reports a
safety problem, it
is corrected in a
timely manner.

305

1

7

1.58 2.51

-0.20

0.14

-0.96

0.28

305

1

7

1.49 2.21

0.57

0.14

-0.61

0.28

305

1

7

1.16 1.35

-1.09

0.14

1.29

0.28

305

1

7

1.80 3.25

-0.64

0.14

-0.76

0.28

305

1

7

1.53 2.36

-0.36

0.14

-0.60

0.28
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FS41. Pilots are
satisfied with the
way this Aircraft
Management
Company (AMC)
deals with safety
reports.

305

1

7

1.67 2.78

-0.36

0.14

-0.86

0.28

305

1

7

1.52 2.32

0.65

0.14

-0.38

0.28

305

1

7

1.49 2.21

-0.59

0.14

-0.19

0.28

305

1

7

1.57 2.47

-0.42

0.14

-0.70

0.28

FS45. Personnel
responsible for
safety have a clear
understanding of
the risks involved
in flying the line.

305

1

7

1.62 2.63

-0.83

0.14

-0.11

0.28

FS46. Safety
personnel have
little or no
authority
compared to
operations
personnel.

305

1

7

1.67 2.79

0.10

0.14

-0.94

0.28

FS42. My Aircraft
Management
Company (AMC)
only keeps track
of major safety
problems and
overlooks routine
ones.
FS43. Personnel
responsible for
safety hold a high
status in the
Aircraft
Management
Company (AMC).
FS44. Personnel
responsible for
safety have the
power to make
changes.
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FS47. Safety
personnel
demonstrate a
consistent
commitment to
safety.
IS48.
Management
shows favoritism
to certain pilots.
IS49. Standards of
accountability are
consistently
applied to all
pilots in this
organization.
IS50. When pilots
make a mistake or
do something
wrong, they are
dealt with fairly
by the Aircraft
Management
Company (AMC).
IS51. When an
accident or
incident happens,
management
immediately
blames the pilot.
IS52. Pilots are
seldom asked for
input when
Aircraft
Management
Company (AMC)
procedures are
developed or
changed.

305

1

7

1.41 1.99

-0.92

0.14

0.47

0.28

305

1

7

1.69 2.84

-1.00

0.14

0.10

0.28

305

1

7

1.96 3.84

-0.10

0.14

-1.35

0.28

305

1

7

1.71 2.91

-0.48

0.14

-0.77

0.28

305

1

7

1.70 2.89

0.12

0.14

-0.84

0.28

305

1

7

1.82 3.31

-0.31

0.14

-1.15

0.28
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IS53. Pilots are
actively involved
in identifying and
resolving safety
concerns.

305

1

7

1.70 2.90

-0.39

0.14

-0.97

0.28

IS54. Pilots who
call in sick or
fatigued are
scrutinized by the
chief pilot or other
management
personnel.

305

1

7

2.02 4.07

0.32

0.14

-1.26

0.28

305

1

7

1.73 3.01

1.31

0.14

0.55

0.28

305

1

7

1.93 3.73

-0.51

0.14

-1.09

0.28

305

1

7

1.40 1.95

-1.01

0.14

0.45

0.28

305

2

7

1.15 1.33

-1.04

0.14

1.20

0.28

IS55. Pilots have
little real authority
to make decisions
that affect the
safety of normal
flight operations.
IS56.
Management
rarely questions a
pilot's decision to
delay a flight for a
safety issue.
IS57. Pilots view
the Aircraft
Management
Company's
(AMC's) safety
record as their
own and take
pride in it.
IS58. Pilots who
don't fly safely
quickly develop a
negative
reputation among
other pilots
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IS59. Pilots with
less seniority are
willing to speak
up regarding flight
safety issues.
IS60. Decisions
made by senior
pilots are difficult
to challenge.
IS61. Pilots don't
cut corners or
compromise
safety regardless
of the operational
pressures to do so.
ER62. I make
errors in my job
from time to time.
ER63. Workload
pressures have at
times affected the
quality of my
work.
ER64. I have
made errors that
have been
detected by other
pilots.
AT65. I will say
something if my
peers (other pilots)
take short cuts.
AT66. I will say
something if my
supervisor takes
shortcuts.

305

1

7

1.42 2.02

-0.98

0.14

0.29

0.28

305

1

7

1.46 2.13

0.91

0.14

-0.05

0.28

305

1

7

1.59 2.53

-0.52

0.14

-0.80

0.28

305

1

5

0.55 0.30

-0.53

0.14

3.84

0.28

305

1

5

0.87 0.76

-1.34

0.14

2.26

0.28

305

1

5

0.56 0.31

-0.77

0.14

4.55

0.28

305

2

5

0.57 0.33

-0.47

0.14

1.86

0.28

305

1

5

0.71 0.51

-0.81

0.14

1.57

0.28
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AT67. Gut
instincts can be
used in lieu of the
publications and
manuals.

305

1

5

0.97 0.94

0.40

0.14

-0.52

0.28

AT68. There are
better ways of
performing a task
than those
described in the
publications and
manuals.

305

1

5

0.94 0.88

-0.19

0.14

-0.29

0.28

AT69. There are
better ways of
performing a task
than those
described in the
company
operations
manuals.

305

1

5

0.98 0.97

-0.19

0.14

-0.49

0.28

305

1

5

0.88 0.78

0.38

0.14

-0.45

0.28

305

1

5

0.81 0.66

-0.87

0.14

1.17

0.28

305

2

5

0.59 0.35

-0.62

0.14

0.49

0.28

305

2

5

0.57 0.33

-0.64

0.14

0.04

0.28

AT70. Bending a
procedure is not
the same as
breaking it.
AT71. Shortcuts,
in order to get a
task done, are still
violations * of
procedures.
AT72. Reporting
mistakes helps
other people learn
from them.
AT73. Personnel
should be
encouraged to
report their
mistakes.
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PC74. I am
willing to put in a
great deal of effort
beyond that
normally expected
in order to help
this Aircraft
Management
Company (AMC)
be successful.
PC75. I talk up
this Aircraft
Management
Company (AMC)
to my friends as a
great organization
to work for.
PC76. I would
accept almost any
type of pilot
assignment in
order to keep
working for this
Aircraft
Management
Company (AMC).
PC77. I find that
my values and the
Aircraft
Management
Company's
(AMC's) values
are very similar.
PC78. I am proud
to tell others that I
am part of this
Aircraft
Management
Company (AMC).

305

1

7

1.24 1.55

-1.33

0.14

2.05

0.28

305

1

7

1.72 2.96

-0.64

0.14

-0.50

0.28

305

1

7

1.85 3.43

0.08

0.14

-1.20

0.28

305

1

7

1.77 3.14

-0.47

0.14

-0.84

0.28

305

1

7

1.67 2.78

-0.91

0.14

-0.06

0.28
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PC79. This
Aircraft
Management
Company (AMC)
really inspires the
best in me in the
way of job
performance.
PC80. I am
extremely glad I
chose this Aircraft
Management
Company (AMC)
to work for over
others I was
considering at the
time I joined.
PC81. I really care
about the fate of
this Aircraft
Management
Company (AMC).
PC82. For me, this
is the best of all
Aircraft
Management
Companies
(AMCs) for which
to work.
EL83. Company
managers conduct
their personal
lives in an ethical
manner.
EL84. Company
management
defines success
not just by results
but also the way
that they are
obtained.

305

1

7

1.71 2.91

-0.44

0.14

-0.69

0.28

305

1

7

1.84 3.40

-0.85

0.14

-0.41

0.28

305

1

7

1.38 1.91

-1.96

0.14

3.72

0.28

305

1

7

1.78 3.18

-1.16

0.14

0.12

0.28

305

1

5

0.93 0.86

-0.34

0.14

0.47

0.28

305

1

5

0.99 0.98

-0.29

0.14

-0.41

0.28

148
EL85. Company
management
listens to what
employees have to
say.

305

1

5

1.11 1.24

-0.22

0.14

-0.85

0.28

EL86. Company
management
disciplines
employees who
violate ethical
standards.

305

1

5

0.90 0.81

-0.97

0.14

0.68

0.28

305

1

5

1.07 1.15

-0.15

0.14

-0.77

0.28

305

1

5

1.18 1.40

0.13

0.14

-0.91

0.28

305

1

5

1.01 1.03

-0.91

0.14

0.41

0.28

EL90. Company
management sets
an example of
how to do things
the right way in
terms of ethics.

305

1

5

1.23 1.50

0.02

0.14

-1.12

0.28

EL91. Company
management has
the best interests
of employees in
mind.

305

1

5

1.12 1.25

0.23

0.14

-0.76

0.28

EL92. When
making decisions,
company
management asks
"what is the right
thing to do?"

305

1

5

1.09 1.20

0.05

0.14

-0.77

0.28

EL87. Company
management
makes fair and
balanced
decisions.
EL88. Company
management can
be trusted.
EL89. Company
management
discusses business
ethics or values
with employees.
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A93. I am more
likely to make
judgement errors
in abnormal or
emergency
situations.

305

1

5

1.01 1.03

0.24

0.14

-0.94

0.28
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APPENDIX D
Tables
Table D1
Total Variance Explained for EFA
Initial Eigenvalues

Extraction Sums of
Squared Loadings

Rotation Sums of
Squared Loadings

% of *Cumul
% of *Cumul
% of
Comp Total
Var.
%
Total
Var
%
Total
Var
1
18.886 46.064 46.064 18.886 46.064 46.064 9.320 22.733
2
2.227 5.431 51.495 2.227 5.431 51.495 8.514 20.766
3
1.792 4.370 55.865 1.792 4.370 55.865 2.630 6.414
4
1.585 3.865 59.730 1.585 3.865 59.730 2.260 5.511
5
1.245 3.036 62.766 1.245 3.036 62.766 2.196 5.355
6
1.096 2.674 65.440 1.096 2.674 65.440 1.764 4.301
7
1.033 2.519 67.959 1.033 2.519 67.959 1.180 2.878
*Cumul % is the Cumulative Percentage

*Cumul
%
22.733
43.499
49.913
55.424
60.780
65.081
67.959
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Table D2
Rotated Correlation Matrix for EFA

OC8.
OC9.
OC10.
OC11.
OC14.
OC16.
OC17.
OC19.
OC20.
OP21.
OP22.
OP23.
OP24.
OP27.
OP28.
OP29.
OP31.
FS36.
FS38.
FS40.
FS41.
FS42.
FS47.
IS48.
IS49.
IS53.
ER62.
ER64.
AT66.
AT68.
AT69.
AT70.
PC74.
EL83.
EL84.
EL85.
EL87.

1
-.680
-.793
-.777
.481
.529
.643
.618
-.709
.527
.449
-.639
-.661
.623
-.627
.708
-.768
.475

.452
.497
-.531
.440
-.403
.380
.361

2
-.460
-.382
-.383
.441
.382
.379
.423
-.428
.309
.404

Components
3
4

5

6

7

.387
.376
.331
.483

-.343
.391
-.347

.482

.462
.421
-.343
.383
-.601
.596
.447

.420
.365

.753
.716
.330
.339

.447

.457
.889
.897
.801
.917
.891
.524
.687

.308
.409
.350

.650
.638
.718
.809

-.346
.396
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EL88.
.344
.821
EL90.
.333
.831
EL91.
.331
.806
EL92.
.807
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 13 iterations.
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APPENDIX E
Suggested Future CASS Survey Questions
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OC8. Management is more concerned with making money than being safe.
OC9. Management expects pilots to push for on-time performance, even if it means
compromising safety.
OC10. Management doesn't show much concern for safety until there is an accident or an
incident.
OC14. My Aircraft Management Company (AMC) is willing to invest money and effort
to improve safety.
OC16. My Aircraft Management Company (AMC) ensures that maintenance on aircraft
is adequately performed and that aircraft are safe to operate.
OC17. Management goes above and beyond regulatory minimums when it comes to
issues of flight safety.
OC19. Management tries to get around safety requirements whenever they get a chance.
OC20. Management views regulation violations very seriously, even when they don't
result in any serious damage.
OP21. Chief pilots do not hesitate to contact line pilots to proactively discuss safety
issues.
OP23. As long as there is no accident or incident, chief pilots don't care how flight
operations are performed.
OP24. Chief pilots have a clear understanding of risks associated with flight operations.
OP27. Dispatch inappropriately uses the MEL (e.g., use when it would be better to fix
equipment).
OP29. Dispatch would rather take a chance with safety than cancel a flight.
FS40. When a pilot reports a safety problem, it is corrected in a timely manner.
FS41. Pilots are satisfied with the way this Aircraft Management Company (AMC) deals
with safety reports.
FS42. My Aircraft Management Company (AMC) only keeps track of major safety
problems and overlooks routine ones.
FS47. Safety personnel demonstrate a consistent commitment to safety.

